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INTRODUCTION
Few organizational acronyms are more familiar to Americans than
those of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) and the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Although neither organization is
particularly popular,1 both loom large in American life and popular culture.
Because there is a tax aspect to just about everything, it should come as no
surprise that the domains of the NCAA and the IRS overlap in a number of
ways. For many decades, college athletics have enjoyed unreasonably
generous tax treatment—sometimes because of the failure of the IRS to
enforce the tax laws enacted by Congress, and sometimes because Congress
itself has conferred dubious tax benefits on college sports. Very recently,
however, there have been signs of what may be a major attitudinal shift on
the part of Congress—although, so far, there have been no signs of a
corresponding change at the IRS.
This Article offers an in-depth look at the history and current status of
four areas of intersection between the federal tax laws and college sports.
Part I considers the possible application of the tax on unrelated business
income to big-time college sports. It concludes that, even in the absence of
any change in the unrelated business income statute, there is a strong
argument that revenues from the televising of college sports should be
subject to the unrelated business income tax. Part II examines the tax status
of athletic scholarships. It explains that athletic scholarships, as currently
structured, are taxable under the terms of the Internal Revenue Code but that
1. The IRS, however, may be less unpopular than conventional wisdom would have it. In a recent
national survey, 58% of respondents expressed a favorable opinion of the IRS while only 33% indicated
an unfavorable opinion. PEW RESEARCH CTR ., MAJORITIES EXPRESS FAVORABLE OPINIONS OF SEVERAL
FEDERAL AGENCIES, INCLUDING THE FBI 1 (2018), https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/4/2018/02/02-14-18-agencies-release.pdf.
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the IRS seems to have made a conscious decision not to enforce the law.
While the first two Parts of this Article address areas in which the
traditional sweetheart arrangement between the IRS and the NCAA remains
in effect, the final two Parts of this Article consider areas in which Congress
has—very recently—intervened to increase the tax burden on college
athletics. Part III describes how Congress, three decades ago, explicitly
permitted taxpayers to claim charitable deductions for most of the cost of
season tickets to college football and basketball games and how Congress in
2017—to the surprise of many observers, including the authors of this
article—repealed this special tax benefit. Finally, Part IV addresses issues of
both statutory interpretation and policy raised by Congress’s creation, in
2017, of a twenty-one percent excise tax on at least some universities that
were paying seven-figure salaries to their football and basketball coaches.
This Article’s conclusion suggests the IRS should follow the lead of
Congress and reconsider the administrative favoritism toward college sports
described in Parts I and II.
I. ARE COLLEGE ATHLETICS RELATED TO A UNIVERSITY’S
EXEMPT PURPOSE?
A. THE THREE TYPES OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS: INTRAMURALS,
NONREVENUE SPORTS, AND REVENUE SPORTS
Athletics have long been part of university life, dating back to the
nineteenth century, if not before. 2 The variety of university athletic
endeavors may be considered in ascending order of their economic
significance. Within the four-year undergraduate experience (or five if we
count the redshirt year3—and in this context, we surely should), there are at
least three subdivisions of athletic activity that require somewhat separate
consideration and involve increasing cause for concern about the soundness
of the current tax treatment.
The first, and least problematic, category is intramural athletics, in
2. In 1876 representatives from Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Columbia created the
Intercollegiate Football Association. Michael Oriard, Gridiron Football, ENCYCLOPÆ DIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/sports/gridiron-football#ref402865 (last visited July 25, 2019).
3. College athletes generally have four years of eligibility to compete in intercollegiate sports.
However, they are liberally allowed to decline participation during one year, the “redshirt” year, in which
they typically continue to practice with their teams if injuries do not prevent this. The term redshirt year
came about because, at least in some historical period, they wore jerseys that indicated their
nonparticipant status in that year. This privilege is frequently used in college football; incoming freshmen
commonly redshirt their first season at their given university to maintain eligibility in the four following
years.
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which teams of students from various houses, fraternities, or other affinity
groups compete with teams of students representing other similar groups
within the same university. These activities involve the use of some
university resources—playing fields or courts, equipment, and usually one
or more paid referees, along with some office support in creating and
distributing schedules, compiling standings, and the like. A purist might
observe that intramural sports are not strictly educational—they rarely
involve any coaching or instruction—and so are not in pursuit of the exempt
educational purpose of the university in a direct way. But that would be an
unduly narrow view of exempt purpose. Students are not expected to spend
every waking hour attending classes or studying; they have fuller lives and
should spend at least some time engaged in activities involving art, music,
drama, and recreation, including athletics. Such activities make students
healthier and happier and are quite reasonably regarded as an integral part of
normal student life. This type of athletic endeavor thus raises few if any
issues of appropriate relation to an exempt mission.
Much the same could be said—though less confidently—of the second
category of college and university athletics. This category would consist of
intercollegiate athletics—both of the “varsity” and “club” style4 —that do
not, and are not expected to, produce significant revenue or at least not net
income after allowing for the often considerable costs of engaging in these
sports. Traditionally, this “nonrevenue” category has consisted of virtually
all intercollegiate athletics other than the football and men’s basketball
programs at the highest tier of the college sports hierarchy—the group of
programs that the NCAA has denominated as “Division I.”
Defense of nonrevenue intercollegiate athletics as within a university’s
exempt purposes is somewhat more challenging than it is for intramural
athletics. In light of the fact that few universities in the world (though most
in the United States) engage in intercollegiate athletics at all, it is difficult to
maintain that such activities are even a normal, much less a necessary part
of the student’s university experience. And although nearly every U.S.
college or university does engage in intercollegiate athletics at some level,
relatively few students at each institution participate in any intercollegiate
sports. Furthermore, those who do frequently find that participation in these
activities diminishes rather than enhances their overall educational
4. According to University of New Hampshire (“UNH”) Athletic Director Marty Scarano, the
main difference between the “varsity” and “club” classification is university funding. Although the level
of competition may be commensurate with varsity athletics, because most of UNH’s funding goes to
football, hockey, and basketball, many other sports are classified as “club” sports. Ryan Hartley, Varsity
Sports vs. Club Sports: It Comes Down to a Matter of Dollars and Cents, THE N.H., Apr. 23, 2010, at 20.
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experience, if only because of the demands of time and energy imposed on
the student-athlete. 5
The lack of a compelling connection to the educational mission together
with the distinct possibility that nonrevenue intercollegiate athletics may in
some cases reduce the value of the educational experience of the studentathlete is troubling on many grounds. However, it is not ultimately troubling
in terms of any issues posed by federal tax law. Although the relevant statute
requires that organizations seeking exempt status pursue their charitable
purposes “exclusively,” the Treasury Regulations implementing this
provision have long interpreted this requirement to be satisfied as long as
charitable purposes are primary.6
Thus, if nonrevenue intercollegiate athletics can be shown to be merely
incidental activities of colleges and universities, and not primary, their
presence on campus should not represent a threat to the institution’s
qualification for exemption. 7 In most cases, the incidental quality of
nonrevenue sports would not be difficult to demonstrate. In the case of Duke
University, for example, the array of intercollegiate teams includes twelve
men’s teams and thirteen women’s teams. 8 This is a considerable roster of
teams for a relatively low-enrollment university. 9 Nevertheless, the total
expenditure for the athletics department—roughly $109 million in the 2017–
2018 academic year10—is only a small fraction of the university’s overall
budget (not including the Duke Health System) of over $5.5 billion. 11 And
5. The general NCAA guideline is that during each sport’s defined season up to twenty hours per
week of the student-athlete’s time can be claimed by the team for practices, conditioning, and related
activities. This does not include travel time to games that are not staged on the student’s own campus.
Also, these guidelines have artificial time-accounting rules. For example, the athletic event itself is
presumed never to exceed three hours, even if the event is a thirty-six-hole golf tournament that may take
more than eight.
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2019).
7. Public universities are not subject to the income tax because they are instrumentalities of state
governments, rather than nonprofit corporations. Accordingly, they do not need to demonstrate that they
primarily serve an exempt purpose (though they presumably could do so if they needed to). See Ellen P.
Aprill, Excluding the Income of State and Local Governments: The Need for Congressional Action, 26
GA. L. REV. 421, 423 (1992).
8. There are men’s and women’s teams in basketball, cross-country, fencing, golf, lacrosse,
soccer, swimming, softball, track and field, and tennis. In addition there are men’s teams in baseball,
football, and wrestling and women’s teams in field hockey, rowing, and volleyball.
9. During the 2017−2018 academic year, Duke had about 6,500 undergraduate students. U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Duke University, EQUITY ATHLETICS D ATA ANALYSIS, https://ope.ed.gov/athletics/#/
institution/search (last visited Aug. 3, 2019) (enter “Duke University” into the “Name” field; then follow
“Continue” hyperlink; select “Duke University”; then follow “Continue” hyperlink).
10. Id.
11. Trustees Reappoint Brodhead, Approve Budget, Projects, D UKE TODAY (May 12, 2012),
https://today.duke.edu/2012/05/trusteesmay2012.
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while the total number of students at Duke who engage in intercollegiate
athletics in any year runs to around 650, that is only about 10 percent of the
total population of undergraduate students. 12 Thus, even if intercollegiate
athletics were determined to be unrelated to the exempt purposes of the
university, it would seem that they were incidental and did not constitute a
primary purpose of the university.
Of course if they are unrelated to the exempt purposes, the possibility
arises that these activities might generate unrelated business income. But
these sports are called “nonrevenue” sports for a reason. In most cases, they
are not literally without revenue: spectators ordinarily pay small admission
charges to watch athletic events in some sports within the nonrevenue
category, such as soccer, baseball, and lacrosse games. 13 And some
television networks, in their continued quest to find the bottom of the
public’s appetite for college sports, have begun televising many of these
events, including the College World Series (men’s baseball), the counterpart
tournament for women’s softball, the final three rounds of the NCAA
Division I lacrosse tournament, and even regular season women’s basketball
games, among many others.
So one is left thinking that the nonrevenue category is one to be
watched; at any time, a sport may achieve a breakthrough level of popularity
that will generate enough spectator interest—both live and on television—
that it will need to be promoted to the “revenue sport” category. And the
breakthroughs can be sudden: the University of Arizona baseball team, for
example, had regular season home-gate receipts of $69,000 in 2011 14 —a
nontrivial amount, to be sure, but barely enough to cover even a few
scholarships for the players who received them. 15 The box office boomed the
following year, however, largely due to the construction of a new stadium:
in 2012 Arizona’s baseball team generated $350,000 in home gate receipts,
more than a five-fold increase in a single year.16

12. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 9.
13. Practices with respect to admission charges in sports other than basketball and football vary
widely. But at Duke University, charges in the range of five to ten dollars per ticket are the price of
admission to the sorts of events noted in the text.
14. Alicia Jessop, University of Arizona Baseball: Making the College World Series . . . and
Money, FORBES (June 13, 2012, 12:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2012/06/13/
university-of-arizona-baseball-making-the-college-world-series-and-money.
15. In the 2018−2019 school year, the NCAA permitted Division I baseball programs 11.7
scholarships per year. College Athletic Scholarship Limits 2018−19, SCHOLARSHIP STATS.COM ,
http://scholarshipstats.com/ncaalimits.html (last visited July 14, 2019). This means that a college can
distribute partial and full scholarships totaling the value of 11.7 full scholarships per year. Id.
16. Jessop, supra note 14.
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But even though Arizona went on to win the College World Series in
that year, its athletic director denied that the sport generated significant net
income. 17 That denial is entirely plausible because the scholarship, coaching,
equipment, and travel costs of fielding a twenty-five-player team and
transporting the team around the country to play its schedule are
considerable;18 generating revenue in the six-figure or even low seven-figure
range would not likely be enough to make the sport profitable. 19 And without
profit, there would be no tax liability under the unrelated business income
tax.
If the nonrevenue sports are put aside for the moment—subject to
further review in the replay booth from time to time—we are left with the
football and men’s basketball programs at Division I universities. At the
present time, there are 351 universities in Division I, 20 of which 255 compete
in football. 21 Even within this category, not all programs enjoy net income
in any particular year. 22 In particular the teams in the five “power
conferences”—the Atlantic Coast, the Big Ten, the Southeastern, the Big 12,
and the Pac 12 conferences, plus the Big East in basketball—are the sixtyfour to seventy-five institutions that are either actually or potentially
profitable enough to be worthy of consideration for the unrelated business

17. The Arizona athletic director at the time, Greg Byrne, explained: “It’s not a big
moneymaker . . . . We made a little bit of money on licensing from National Championship shirts . . . .”
Kyle Johnson, Greg Byrne Talks Facilities, Olympics, College World Series, DAILY WILDCAT (Aug. 22,
2012, 10:58 PM), http://www.wildcat.arizona.edu/article/2012/08/greg-byrne-talks-facilities-olympicscollege-world-series.
18. According to The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool, Duke reports spending about
$30 million on all sports other than football or basketball in the 2017–2018 academic year. U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., supra note 9. The number of baseball players in the Duke program was about 6 percent of the total
of athletes in sports other than football and basketball. Id. If their expenses are proportionate, this would
suggest that about $1.8 million was spent on the baseball program.
19. For example, the University of California, Berkeley baseball team was nearly dropped from
the roster of California teams in 2010 because of the substantial financial losses the team had incurred in
the preceding years. Herb Benenson, Baseball Program Will Continue at UC Berkeley, BERKELEY NEWS
(April 8, 2011), https://news.berkeley.edu/2011/04/08/baseball-to-continue-at-cal. It was estimated that
the expense of conducting their baseball program was approximately $1 million per year but that it
generated only $180,000 in revenue. It has since been resurrected as a result of a successful $10 million
fundraising effort. Id.
20. Our Three Divisions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/
our-three-divisions (last visited Aug. 3, 2013).
21. For football, Division I is divided into the Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”) and the Football
Championship Subdivision (“FCS”). Unlike the FBS, the FCS plays a full postseason playoff to crown a
national champion. The FBS schools also tend to spend more money on their football teams.
22. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 116, 119 (2d
ed. 2019); DANIEL L. FULKS, THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASS’N, 2004−08 NCAA REVENUES
AND E XPENSES OF NCAA D IVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 28 (2009),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED506793.pdf.
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income tax.23
We have gone through the stages of increasing concern about the
relationships of college sports to the institutions represented largely because
this is a classic problem of the “slippery slope” variety.24 Sports seem related
to other things that colleges do but seem less and less related the closer we
get to a situation in which, for example, a basketball team consists largely of
athletes who never intend to spend more than one semester actually attending
classes. 25 At some point, one senses that one is no longer in the land of higher
education but is instead in the realm of national-audience entertainment. But
where is the line to be drawn? Read on.
B. ARE BIG-TIME COLLEGE ATHLETICS RELATED TO A UNIVERSITY’S
EXEMPT PURPOSE?
Having tightened the focus solely on the big-time sports of college
football and men’s college basketball, we can begin to consider one of the
central questions in this field: Is pursuit of these sports within a university’s
exempt purpose? If the point of such an inquiry is to determine whether the
university deserves exempt status, all the arguments in Section I.A can be
mustered to support big-time athletics as well: many students participate, and
a much larger number of students watch; colleges have always sought
musicians to staff the orchestra, thespians to fill out the playbill, journalists
to publish the student newspaper. Extracurricular activities are a part of
campus life and athletics not obviously less so than any other extracurricular
activity. None of these activities are strictly necessary, but all contribute to
the university community in their distinctive ways. And, in any event, there
is the saving grace of the “primary” concept: in the aggregate, a university’s

23. If readers recall George Carlin’s observation that it is odd that we drive on parkways but park
on driveways, they will find similarly strange the fact that the Big Ten conference has fourteen members
while the Big 12 conference only ten. But as long as conference membership continues to be remarkably
labile, perhaps they are wise not to change their trademarks too quickly in response to what might be
temporary membership changes.
24. For a thorough discussion on slippery slopes, see generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes,
99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985). Professor Frederick Schauer’s argument is that most things described as
slippery slopes in fact have defensible stopping points where the terrain is a cceptably sticky. Id. at
381−83. That is, in our view, precisely the situation we describe in this Article.
25. The 2012 national championship team from the University of Kentucky is the state-of-the-art
model of the “one-and-done” business plan. And not to be outdone, Duke’s 2015 national championship
team also started four freshmen players, all of whom left the university for the National Basketball
Association (“NBA”) following their freshman years. Because eligibility is determined after the fact, the
four freshmen who were among the starting five in both cases did not really need to pay any attention to
their spring semester classes since they were—and at all times reasonably thought they would be—drafted
into the NBA before any ineligibility was established.
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budget will be dominated by salaries of faculty and academic staff,
construction and upkeep of the laboratories, classrooms and dormitories,
management of the university’s endowment, and many other functions.
Large universities have budgets that run into the billions of dollars, so
athletics budgets that run into the tens of millions will not detract from the
primary mission of the university.
Instead the primary impact of a determination that engaging in big-time
sports is not within the exempt purpose is, of course, that these activities may
then imaginably be subject to taxation as unrelated business activities. 26 And
unlike fencing and volleyball, football and basketball can make enough
money to cover their fully loaded costs and still have a profit worth
subjecting to an unrelated business income tax (“UBIT”).
A brief description of the UBIT may be helpful for readers unfamiliar
with this concept. An organization may qualify (or continue to qualify) as a
tax-exempt organization, eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions, if
its activities are primarily charitable. However, if the organization regularly
carries on trade or business activities that are unrelated to its exempt purpose,
the income from those activities is subject to federal income taxation at the
same rates applicable to for-profit corporations. Following the dramatic cuts
in corporate tax rates accomplished by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,
net corporate earnings are taxed at a rate of 21 percent. 27
There would certainly seem to be a prima facie case for the argument
that Division I football and basketball should be subject to the UBIT. They
would seem to be a business, in that they are operated in a business-like
manner that appears to be designed to generate profit; they are regularly
carried on; and they are (arguably) unrelated to the purposes for which
exempt status was granted to the college or university that houses the
particular program. These are the elements of unrelated business subject to
the tax under § 511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 28 and each seems
satisfied by the facts presented by most big-time programs.
That this is so has been amply documented by others, 29 and there is little
point of rehearsing the full details here. But it may be useful to summarize
the main observations on these points. As to whether big-time sports are a
26. See I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(B) (2018) (imposing the UBIT even on public universities despite their
general exemption from federal income taxes).
27. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 13001, § 11(b), 131 Stat. 2054, 2096–
98.
28. I.R.C. § 511(a); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (2019) (defining what constitutes an
unrelated trade or business).
29. See, e.g., CLOTFELTER, supra note 22, at 115−30.
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business, one would note that they generate a tremendous amount of revenue
through the sales of tickets, television and radio rights, and merchandise,
especially apparel, related to the sports programs. 30 The athletic activities are
heavily promoted through a variety of media, especially television. The
salaries of head coaches are routinely two to four times the salaries of the
university president and ten times or more the median salary of full-time
faculty members.31 (And when these are questioned, the usual defense is that
the coach is “worth it,” which appears to be meant in a literal, monetary
sense.) The games themselves are scheduled on dates and at times that are
designed to maximize ratings for the broadcasts. 32 Tickets to the most
popular big-time sports programs are allocated on the basis of seat licenses
that are essentially auctioned off to would-be buyers—whether they have
any relationship with the university or not—for whatever the market will
bear.33
Although the big-time sports contests are seasonal—from late August
to the bowl games in December and January for football, and from late
October until early April for basketball—they are carried on in the same
seasonal way year after year, which is sufficient to meet the “regularly
carried on” leg of the UBIT rules. 34 And, in truth, though the games are
played during only the intervals noted, various other activities—recruiting
of players, setting of schedules, sales of tickets, and so forth go on year
around.
The only leg of the three-legged UBIT stool that could be said to be
30. Note that some merchandise is very directly related to the sports programs (for example, replica
jerseys with the names and numbers of particular players; shirts or other articles that carry legends, such
as “Duke Basketball” and “2010 NCAA Basketball Champions;” and even, in Duke’s case, tabletop
models of Cameron Indoor Stadium, our local temple of basketball worship). It is also reasonable to
assume that big-time sports programs contribute to the market for more generalized university apparel
and gifts. In Duke’s case, the full array of merchandise can be viewed on the official athletics website of
the university, http://www.goduke.com. The “.com” designation in itself seems an admission that some
business is transacted.
31. Duke basketball coach Mike Krzyzewski received a salary of $8.89 million in the 2016–2017
academic year. Chris Chavez, Coach K, John Calipari Top the List of Highest Paid College Basketball
Coaches, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/03/01/
highest-paid-college-basketball-coaches-salaries-mike-krzyewski-john-calipari.
32. Steve Eder et al., At Louisville, Athletic Boom Is Rooted in ESPN Partnership, N.Y. T IMES
(Aug. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/sports/at-louisville-an-athletic-boom-made-forand-by-tv.html.
33. CLOTFELTER, supra note 22, at 122−26.
34. The understanding of seasonal activities as being regularly carried on has been part of
Congressional intent from the beginning, as explained in the legislative history of the Revenue Act of
1950, which created the UBIT: “If an organization owned a race track, this would not be considered an
occasional activity even though the track was operated only a few weeks every year, since it is usual to
carry on such a trade or business only during a particular season.” H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 109 (1950).
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contestable would be the question of whether these activities are related to
the broader educational enterprise housing them. Even as to this factor, the
case for application of the UBIT seems clear enough. The “student-athletes”
in these programs seem more like athletes than students: they are selected
primarily for their athletic ability rather than their academic ability; they
devote huge amounts of time to their sports, especially during the primary
seasons for their sport but even in their respective off-seasons; they are
ordinarily expected not to engage in other intercollegiate sports and not to
take classes at times that would conflict with times set aside for practices or
games; they travel extensively, during which they necessarily miss classes;
they receive extensive “academic support” from athletic department staff
that frequently blurs the line between tutoring and actually doing classwork
on behalf of the students so “supported”; they have generally poor graduation
rates; and they rarely choose any of the more challenging major fields of
study available on their campuses.
Coaches are hired for their ability to win games and fired for any
shortcomings in that metric. Their incentive pay may include a nod toward
the academic side of the university (for example, a bonus for achieving a
particular graduation rate), but those incentives pale in comparison with the
incentives to field successful teams. Studies of the bonus structure faced by
coaches have found that the rewards for success on the field are
approximately twelve times as large as the rewards for success in the
classroom. 35
Expensive facilities for training, practice, and the actual games are,
typically, built for the exclusive use of athletes in the big-time programs. At
many universities, the student-athletes are even housed and fed in facilities
that are separate from (and, invariably in such cases, superior to) the facilities
available to students who are not athletes in one of the big-time sports.
C. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE UBIT TO COLLEGE SPORTS: THE VIEWS OF
CONGRESS, THE IRS, AND THE COURTS
Despite the seemingly tangential relationship between a university’s
big-time sports programs and the educational institution whose name they
share, all of the major sources of rules affecting the tax system—Congress,
the IRS, and the courts—have universally declared big-time sports to be
sufficiently related to the educational enterprise to avoid the status of

35.

See CLOTFELTER, supra note 22, at 149−50 (citing BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., MISSION
(1st ed. 2008)).
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unrelated business activity. 36
This has been true from the very beginning—that is, from the date of
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1950, which created the UBIT. Though
big-time college sports are not specifically mentioned in the legislative
language itself, the committee reports take considerable pains—one might
almost say that they protest too much—to make it clear that Congress could
not even conceive of the new tax applying to college sports. The House Ways
and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, respectively,
seem to have agreed to use something of a zone defense of college sports,
with the former specifically defending college football and the latter college
basketball. 37 A report from the House Ways and Means Committee
explained that “[o]f course, [indeed!] income of an educational organization
from charges for admissions to football games would not be deemed to be
income from an unrelated business, since its athletic activities are
substantially related to its educational program.”38 Likewise, a report from
the Senate Finance Committee stated that “[a]thletic activities of schools are
substantially related to their educational functions. For example, a university
would not be taxable on income derived from a basketball tournament
sponsored by it, even where the teams were composed of students of other
schools.”39
The IRS did not immediately follow with its own pronouncements on
the applicability of the UBIT to college sports, presumably because it did not
feel that it needed to. It simply took no actions that would be inconsistent
with the language of the legislative history, which sent an unambiguous
message that the IRS should not and would not consider college sports as
unrelated to the exempt purposes of the colleges that pursued those sports.
Because the IRS did not attempt to assess any taxes on unrelated business
income (“UBI”) with respect to big-time athletics activities, the courts were
not called on to make any determinations about the applicability of UBIT
doctrines to this area. However, some older opinions could be found to

36. See infra notes 37–44 and accompanying text.
37. Their respective choices are a little odd in light of the fact that college basketball was originally
an urban sport, played in dank gymnasiums of Catholic high schools and colleges in New York,
Philadelphia, and a few other cities. Football, in contrast, was of special interest to the fans of the big
state universities of the West, Midwest, and South. In light of the malapportionment of the Senate in favor
of states like Nebraska, Mississippi, and Oklahoma, one might have thought that football was their
preferred sport. This reasoning presumably explains the misattribution of the two quotations in the text
by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195, which erroneously casts the House as the
defender of basketball and the Senate as the defender of football.
38. H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 109 (1950).
39. S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 29 (1950), as reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3082.
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support the idea that college sports were appropriately regarded as integral
to educational experiences.40
Occasionally the IRS issued rulings regarding qualification for
exemption by athletic support groups at a variety of levels of amateur sports:
in Revenue Ruling 55-587, the IRS ruled that an interscholastic body to
oversee high-school athletic competition could qualify as a charitable
organization;41 in Revenue Ruling 64-275, the IRS ruled that a sailing school
designed to train teams of athletes for international competition, including
the Olympics, could also qualify as a charitable organization; 42 and in
Revenue Ruling 67-291, the IRS ruled that an alumni organization that
supported a college’s “training table” for feeding members of athletics teams
could qualify as a charitable organization. 43 None of these organizations
produced significant revenue, however, so no unrelated business tax issues
were discussed in any of these rulings. And of course even if UBIT issues
had been raised, the finding that the activities described did constitute
exempt purposes would presumably have answered any questions about
whether the IRS regarded these activities as related to exempt purpose.
1. Television and the UBIT
During this time, the value of the rights to broadcast and televise some
big-time sports events—especially college football bowl games and the
NCAA basketball tournament—was growing. The 1979 basketball
championship—featuring Larry Bird’s Indiana State team playing Magic
Johnson’s Michigan State team—achieved a college-sports record singlegame Nielsen rating of 24.1, with a 38 percent audience share at its peak.
This translated to a television audience of 18 million households—18 million
households with a thirst for beer and soft drinks, a yen for pickup trucks, and
a mighty appetite for fast food, at least in the judgment of the firms that
decided to advertise their wares in this venue.
Perhaps spurred by this heightened attention, the IRS shortly thereafter
ruled that television and radio revenue generated by college sporting events
did not constitute unrelated business activity. In Revenue Ruling 80-296, it
opined, after a brief and very superficial analysis involving the facts of a

40. See, e.g., Comm’rs of D.C. v. Shannon & Luchs Constr. Co., 17 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1927)
(involving the exercise of eminent domain to acquire property for a school athletic field, summarizing
the case law on the subject, and noting that “courts . . . uniformly hold that physical culture and
development is an essential part of our educational system”).
41. Rev. Rul. 55-587, 1955-2 C.B. 261.
42. Rev. Rul. 64-275, 1964-2 C.B. 142.
43. Rev. Rul. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184.
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college football game, that:
[T]he educational purposes served by exhibiting a game before an
audience that is physically present and exhibiting the game on television
or radio before a much larger audience are substantially similar. Therefore,
the sale of the broadcasting rights and the resultant broadcasting of the
game contributes [sic] importantly to the accomplishment of the
organization’s exempt purpose.44

Really? The live audience and the television audience are “substantially
similar?” Consider a typical football weekend at a Big Ten or Southeastern
Conference university (Ohio State, Florida, Penn State, Alabama, to name a
few). The fun for the students begins on Friday night with a pep rally, maybe
a bonfire, and certainly major partying. On Saturday morning while the
students are sleeping off their hangovers, the alumni begin to arrive in their
SUVs and station wagons for the tailgating that will precede the game. The
alumni often join with former classmates arriving from different directions,
creating hundreds of mini-reunions scattered over the massive acreage of the
stadium parking lot. Then, as kickoff approaches, the students and alumni
file into the stadium along with faculty, staff, and members of the community
whose relationships with the university may be less intimate but who are,
nevertheless, loyal fans, willing to pay hundreds of dollars for their season
tickets.
The university president and the deans of the graduate and professional
units will take their particularly desirable seats along with trustees and other
major donors or people who are targets for such status. After the game, the
partying will resume, with more or less festivity, depending on the outcome
of the game. Not all of this activity is appealing or healthy, but it does all
have some connection with the operations of the university.
Compare this with the experience of the television audience. That group
will, in the case of a nationally televised game, number in the millions, of
which only a small percentage will have even the most remote connection
with the university.45 Most will not even be in the same state, much less the
same zip code, as the host university. Most of these viewers tune in to be
44. Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195.
45. How small the percentage may be no doubt varies. Many of the universities in the “Power
Five” conferences are large public schools with up to a few hundred thousand living alumni. Especially
in the case of a regional telecast of a large state university’s games, the percentage of viewers who have
some connection with the university—as alumni, students, or parents—may be substantial. Even in those
cases (which are not the ones that generate the most revenue for the networks), one doubts that
“connected” viewers would constitute a majority of the audience. And at the other extreme when a
relatively small and new university, such as Boise State, is on national television, the “connected” viewers
would almost certainly be a single-digit percentage of the total audience.
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entertained by the athletic display. Some may hope to be enriched if they
have wagers on the game with their online bookies in the Bahamas. Some
may simply have nothing better to do. What they generally do not have is
any interest in the educational enterprise that is associated with the
universities whose student-athletes are on the field.
So these audiences are “substantially similar”? One would not think so.
Defenders of big-time college sports base their defense of existing practices
largely in terms of building their university communities—fostering “school
spirit,” collective identity, and closer connections among and between the
various constituent groups making up the university: students,
administrators, trustees, and alumni and perhaps people who operate
businesses in the general vicinity of the university. But much less of that is
going on in the national television audience. Rarely, if ever, would a
university defend its sports programs on grounds that they serve to entertain
a national audience of people who are largely strangers to the university
community.
There may be one exception to this: university officials do sometimes
mention that successful big-time sports programs may produce increased
interest on the part of potential applicants for admission, which in turn may
translate into an increase in applicant volume. The evidence on this is mixed,
but the prevailing view seems to be that success does produce a modest (and
transient) increase in applicant volume but only for the very small number
of universities at the very pinnacle of achievement in football or basketball—
literally only the teams that win a major bowl game or make it to the Final
Four of the NCAA basketball tournament. 46
So this effect is small, affects only a few universities, and, even when
present, may be a mixed blessing. If the marginal applications stimulated by
athletic success are largely from students who are not well qualified for
admission to that university, there is little benefit at all.47 But it is probably
true that at least some of the marginal applicants are well enough qualified
to be accepted and perhaps enroll. However, a provost at such a university
46. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 22, at 227−30. One study that Professor Charles Clotfelter cites
does find an effect, albeit a very small and transient one, resulting from finishing in the top twenty in
football or making the round of sixteen in the basketball tournament. Devin G. Pope & Jaren C. Pope,
The Impact of College Sports Success on the Quantity and Quality of Student Applications, 75 S. ECON.
J., 750, 762–63, 776 (2009).
47. One effect of increased applicant volume is that the apparent selectivity of the university may
increase, as it accepts a smaller percentage of its fattened applicant pool. This may be slightly helpful;
however, the U.S. News methodology (as an example) weighs acceptance rate as 10 percent of the
“selectivity score,” which in turn is only 15 percent of the overall score. Thus, acceptance rate is weighted
at only 1.5 percent of the overall score.
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might well wonder whether it was necessarily a good thing that a few
applicants whose interest in the university was based largely on its athletic
success were displacing a similar number of applicants who were almost as
well qualified and were attracted to the university by its other qualities—
qualities more closely associated with the things that universities claim to
value.
A related argument is worth noting. Some universities apparently feel
that participation in big-time sports is a way of putting their institution “on
the map.” It is likely that the visibility of Gonzaga University has been
enhanced by its considerable success in several recent NCAA basketball
championships.48 Similarly, Conference USA, a league that is just short of
“Power Five” status, includes a number of teams representing younger and
less nationally known universities, such as Florida International, the
University of Texas at San Antonio, the University of North Carolina at
Charlotte, and so on. The leadership at these universities clearly believe that
participation in Division I sports provides them with exposure to audiences
that matter to them: potential students, potential faculty, perhaps potential
grant makers, and so on.
Because universities change status from small-time to big-time sports
so infrequently, there is no data on the effects of such a change beyond the
merely anecdotal. It is clear that universities can succeed at the highest
academic levels with every conceivable approach to intercollegiate sports,
from next to nothing (University of Chicago, New York University,
Washington University, Emory University), to being serious about only one
or two nonrevenue sports (Johns Hopkins), to being serious but not big-time
across a wide range of sports (the entire Ivy League), to being nominally bigtime but seemingly content with no more than modest success (with
apologies, Rice University is the conspicuous example), and so on. If nothing
else, this indicates that big-time sports are not necessary to a university’s
academic success and renown. 49 Even if pursuit of big-time sports has
proven transformative in a few instances (Gonzaga, Butler), a few
exceptional cases are a slender reed to support the relatedness of big-time
sports to the primary educational mission of the university.

48. See Dana O’Neill, How the Basketball Program Helped Gonzaga University Flourish, ESPN:
MEN’S C. BASKETBALL BLOG (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.espn.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/
_/id/119205/how-the-basketball-program-helped-gonzaga-university-flourish.
49. It is worth noting, in fact, that only two of the universities in the current U.S. News top ten
national universities list—Stanford and Duke—are members of one of the Power Five conferences. See
National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/
rankings/national-universities?_mode=table (last visited Aug. 4, 2019).
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And, in a way, this argument is beside the point in any case. Generating
greater name recognition—even if it works that way—would not seem to be,
in itself, sufficiently related to the university’s exempt purposes to take an
activity out of the range of the UBIT. Some degree of publicity—ads in the
“Education Life” section of the Sunday New York Times, for example—is
clearly appropriate and within a university’s exempt purpose. But pursuit of
an entire line of business does not become “related” for purposes of the tax
on UBI merely because public recognition of the business may create
recognition of the university as a by-product. If it turned out that a
university’s sponsorship of a traveling circus helped attract donations and
more and better students, would that qualify the circus as related to the
college’s exempt purpose? Similarly, if big-time sports are primarily about
entertaining audiences with limited or no connection to the university, the
fact that there might be ancillary benefits from becoming better known
should not save the entertainment activities from being regarded as unrelated
to the educational mission.
2. The Special Case of Advertising
One reason why it is important to distinguish between the live audience
and the television audience is that the income produced by the attention of
the television audience is largely advertising income. 50 Beginning in the late
1960s, the IRS developed a doctrine that an activity that may be within an
organization’s exempt purpose may also be viewed as a “content provider”
(though, of course, that was not the lexicon of the time) of a sort that makes
it an attractive platform for advertisers. When this situation arises, the IRS
has argued that it is appropriate to view the advertising as a separate
activity—one that is unrelated to the organization’s exempt purpose despite
the fact that the underlying activity may be within its exempt purpose.
In the case of big-time college sports, the income does not come to the
universities directly from the advertisers but rather comes indirectly through
the various television networks that sell the advertising opportunities in the
market. Obviously the magnitude of the available advertising revenue is the
reason that networks are willing to pay substantial sums to the NCAA, or the
various conferences, for the rights to televise big-time athletics contests. And
50. This may be changing. There are now special “networks” that operate by making games—such
as all football games played by Big Ten schools—available only to subscribers who pay for the privilege
of receiving these broadcasts through their regular cable or satellite television provider. In such an
arrangement, the cable or satellite provider presumably keeps some of the subscription cost and pays part
of it to the conference that arranges the telecasts. There may be advertising sold in connection with these
broadcasts as well, but at least a substantial part of the income received by the conference, and passed on
to its member schools, would come from viewers, not advertisers. See infra Section I.C.3.
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the dollar amounts paid for advertising of college sports have grown in recent
years to noteworthy levels. For example, it is estimated that the advertising
revenue associated with the NCAA basketball tournament in 2013 exceeded
one billion dollars!51
Viewing the sale of television rights as implicitly advertising income
has important implications for the application of the UBIT. First, as noted
above, segregating the sale of advertising from the other aspects of an
activity has been used, in effect, to require an independent justification of the
relatedness of the advertising aspect; this means that it is possible that college
sports could be exempt from the UBIT because they are related to exempt
purposes, while the sale of advertising opportunities might not be exempt
because it could not “borrow” the relatedness of the overarching activity.
Second, segregating an advertising element from the rest of the big-time
sports elements would be much more likely to yield accounting results that
would actually show taxable UBI in substantial amounts. Even if the overall
big-time sports picture for a university did not show an excess of revenues
over expenses (and it well might not in light of the possibilities of generating
deductions for major items like depreciation on stadiums and other
facilities), the segregated business of televising college sports would likely
show consistent and large profits.52 The television networks typically cover
the costs of their operations themselves, so the amounts that are paid to the
NCAA or the conferences, and then distributed to the universities, are nearly
pure income.
Finally, the magnitude of television advertising revenue has ballooned
in recent years. It was virtually nil in 1950 when the UBIT provisions were

51. Press Release, Kantar Media, March Madness Generated $1.15 Billion in Ad Revenue in 2013
(Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.kantarmedia.com/us/newsroom/press-releases/march-madness-generated1-15-billion-in-ad-revenue-in-2013 [https://perma.cc/7NYZ-6FUE]. It does not appear that revenue
exceeded this number in subsequent years, though the total continues to be at approximately this level.
See Tim Parker, How Much Does the NCAA Make Off March Madness?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/031516/how-much-does-ncaa-make-marchmadness.asp (last updated June 25, 2019).
52. One highly respected commentator disputes this by saying that even if big-time college sports
were considered an unrelated business activity, the availability of deductions for program costs would
likely wipe out any net income. See John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College Athletics,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109, 142−44, 143 n.151. We disagree and think that one of the purposes of the
fragmentation rule was to split off the costs of the disaggregated activity—in this case, televising sporting
events—from the overall activity. Indeed, if that is not the purpose, it is difficult to see any advantage in
the fragmentation approach. Professor John Colombo concedes that some athletic programs would make
money no matter how liberal the deduction rules might be; and we note as well that the IRS has the power
to amend the accounting rules to produce a better match of the actual expenses of televising sports with
the revenue produced thereby.
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first added to the code. It had grown considerably by 1980 when the IRS
issued Revenue Ruling 80-296, but it was even then miniscule compared
with today’s dollar volume. The continuing rise in the value of television
rights continues to astonish; just when one thinks that one has gotten used to
very large numbers, the numbers grow larger still. Writing in 1980, Professor
Richard Kaplan noted that the broadcast package for the NCAA basketball
tournament had doubled in size over just the preceding two years. 53 How
much was it back then? With the addition of a $2 million payment from the
new Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (“ESPN”) for the
rights to televise some early-round games, the total had grown to $10.5
million54—a tidy sum, no doubt, but only about one percent of the sum paid
for the rights to the tournament in recent years.
The dramatic shape of this growth curve is important because it
provides a powerful reason to reexamine conclusions reached earlier on very
different facts. Television barely existed in 1950, so no one in Congress
could have imagined the revenue possibilities that would come to be almost
seventy years later. By 1980 the IRS might have had a little more reason to
think that growth in revenue was robust and might continue. But no one in
1980 would likely have predicted a hundred-fold increase in television
revenue over the following thirty or so years.55
The amount of money at stake has had some predictable consequences.
Schedules and game times, for example, used to be the province of the
conferences primarily, with input from the athletics directors of the member
schools. Increasingly the dates and times of games are dictated by the
networks that will be televising the events. 56 If it once seemed that sports
teams were appendages of the universities they represented (or vice versa!),
it now seems that they are increasingly the appendages of ESPN. So it is
certainly worth asking just how unrelated to higher education does televised
big-time college sports have to get before we are ready to conclude that it
should be subject to the UBIT.
Before reaching any conclusions, a closer look at the relevant legal
doctrines on segregation of advertising income from other aspects of a

53. Richard L. Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1430, 1445–46 (1980).
54. Id. at 1445.
55. Note that only a small part of this growth is attributable to inflation. The consumer price index
was at 86 when the IRS issued the ruling in 1980 and has grown to about 230 today. So a multiplier of
about 2.7 is the appropriate adjustment for inflation. Thus, instead of a hundred-fold growth, it may be
more appropriate to speak of a real growth of an estimated 35-fold magnitude. That is still huge growth.
56. See Eder et al., supra note 32.
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business conducted by a charitable organization is necessary. The law in this
area stems primarily from United States v. American College of Physicians,
a case involving the applicability of the UBIT to the income derived from
selling advertising space in a publication of the College of Physicians
entitled Annals of Internal Medicine.57 Decided in 1986, this case was the
culminating event in a saga that went on for nearly twenty years.
In 1967 the Treasury promulgated a regulation that adopted a new
approach to the UBIT.58 The Treasury was no doubt concerned that in the
case of some mixed activities, in which some exempt purposes existed but
unrelated business activities were going on as well, aggregating the related
business activities with the unrelated ones would produce accounting
opportunities to offset UBI with the expenses that were incurred in pursuit
of business interests that were related to the organizations’ exempt purposes.
Advertising was the chief target: the reasoning behind the regulation was that
seeking (and finding) businesses that were interested in placing
advertisements in publications of exempt organizations were businesses in
themselves and had nothing to do with exempt purposes of the organizations.
Instead, they were about generating revenue.
This somewhat aggressive position of the Treasury was the object of
criticism, but Congress came to the rescue with uncommon speed. In the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, 59 it amended § 513(c) of the Code to specifically
endorse this “fragmentation” approach to advertising income.
The facts of American College of Physicians illustrate the application
of this theory. The publication involved was clearly within the exempt
purpose of the College of Physicians: it carried articles describing research
outcomes of interest to a wide range of practicing physicians. 60 The articles
were scholarly in nature and were not designed to advance the interests of
any businesses that might have chosen to advertise in the journal. 61 The case
could have been a test case of the fragmentation approach, but after that
approach was endorsed by Congress, such a challenge would presumably
have had to be on constitutional grounds, which the College of Physicians
may have thought too high a bar.
Instead, what was at stake in American College of Physicians was the
57. United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 847–50 (1986).
58. Treatment of Income from Unrelated Trade or Business, 32 Fed. Reg. 17657, 17657 (Dec. 12,
1967) (now codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (2019)).
59. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, sec. 502(c), § 513(c), 83 Stat. 487, 542–43
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 513(c) (2018)).
60. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. at 836.
61. That was the claim anyway, and the IRS does not seem to have contested it.
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specific application of the fragmentation rule to advertising in a professional
journal. The government took the position that all advertising in such
journals was unrelated to exempt purposes; the College of Physicians
disagreed, and the Supreme Court found for the College on this point. But
having won that battle, the College went on to lose the broader war. The
Court declined the IRS proffered per se rule but, upon examining the facts in
the particular case, found that there was little or no editorial control over the
content of the advertising and that the particular ads in each journal issue
could not be said to be in those pages for the purpose of advancing any
charitable purpose of the College of Physicians. 62 They were mostly—and
generally quite baldly—about selling drugs.
The language of Justice Marshall’s opinion suggests that if the College
had, for example, limited advertisers (mostly drug companies) to
advertisements featuring new drugs or only to advertisements that featured
clinical findings that might have educational value for the physicians reading
the journal, then the ads, and the revenue they produced, might have been
found to be related to the exempt purpose of the College. 63 But, of course,
this would have reduced the advertising opportunities significantly, so
absorbing the UBIT was probably the more economically productive
approach.
While the IRS enforcement pattern that is available on the public
record—and, indeed, the text of the regulations themselves—suggests that
the primary interest of the IRS was in print advertising in publications like
the Annals, the text of § 513(c) is not so limited. At no point does it refer
either to publications or advertising explicitly but merely says in relevant
part: “[A]n activity does not lose identity as a trade or business merely
because it is carried on within a larger aggregate of similar activities or
within a larger complex of other endeavors which may, or may not, be related
to the exempt purposes of the organization.”64
This is the sort of maddening draftsmanship that leads tax lawyers to
say that resorting to the code should only be undertaken in the event that the
legislative history is unclear. In this case, the legislative history is clear
enough: Congress meant to endorse the IRS fragmentation approach so that
more or less freestanding, revenue-generating parts of an operation could be
62. See Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. at 847 n.5, 849–50.
63. One imagines that the ads were of a more commercial sort: perhaps a picture of an unhappylooking housewife, sitting at her kitchen table, staring into her cup of coffee, with text that reads: “Does
she just have the blues or is she suffering from a treatable medical condition?” Implicitly it is surely the
latter, and here is just the drug she needs.
64. I.R.C. § 513(c) (2018).
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segregated for purposes of accounting for possible UBI.
The precise targets were a matter of some debate. The House Report
mentioned only advertising income in its report, but proposed broader
language that was not exclusively limited to advertising income. 65 The
Senate added an amendment that would have limited the scope of the
provision, curiously, to three activities specified in its report: advertising,
“sale[s] by a hospital pharmacy of drugs to persons other than hospital
patients,” and “operation[s] of a race track by an exempt organization.”66
The Conference Report adopted the House version with minor wording
changes to make it clear that “no part of [the unrelated activity] is to be
excluded . . . merely because it does not result in profit.”67
The more general language of § 513(c) would seem to make clear that
even if the revenue paid by broadcasters were not considered advertising, it
would not bar application of the fragmentation principle. However, even if
one were to take the narrow view that § 513(c) applied only to advertising
income, it would seem that much of the broadcast and telecast income would
qualify as such. Consider, for example, whether the result in American
College of Physicians would have been any different if the College, instead
of publishing the Annals itself, had arranged to have a third party publish the
Annals, with the understanding that the third party would be allowed to sell
advertising, and pay most of the difference between its advertising revenues
and its cost of publication over to the College. Surely the injection of an
intermediate agent into the production of the Annals would make little
difference in the analysis.
This parallel version of the American College of Physicians facts is
fairly close to what conferences and the NCAA have done with respect to
big-time sports: they have agreed with CBS, ESPN, and others that those
networks will be allowed to sell advertising that will be shown in connection
with game broadcasts, with much of the net revenue derived from those sales
being paid to the conferences or the NCAA. The recent creation of the Big
Ten network indicates that business models involving even more direct sales
of advertising are imaginable and are, in fact, being pursued by some
conferences.
But whether the advertising revenue is collected directly by a network
owned by a conference or indirectly though the medium of a more general
broadcast network, it remains advertising revenue. To that extent, it could be
65.
66.
67.

H.R. REP. N O. 91-413 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1695−96.
S. REP. NO. 91-552 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2104.
H.R. REP. NO. 91-782 (1969) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2392, 2406.
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subjected to a disaggregation analysis that would result in the recognition of
substantial taxable UBI.
Precisely what would this mean? The American College of Physicians
case is opaque on the question of what deductions would be allowed against
the advertising revenue, but Treasury Regulations provide some guidance.
One provision relating to “exploitation of exempt activities” is of particular
interest. 68 Under these rules, if an unrelated income-producing activity
simply exploits an exempt activity, “expenses, depreciation and similar items
attributable to the conduct of the exempt activities are not deductible in
computing unrelated business taxable income.”69
There is an exception to this general prohibition in cases in which the
exempt activity that the unrelated activity exploits is “a type of activity
normally conducted by taxable organizations . . . .”70 But it is unclear if this
exception would apply in this case. It depends on whether college sports are
of the same type as professional sports. Certainly, there are many
similarities; but there are important differences as well, as the NCAA and its
member universities would normally be quick to point out. The athletes, they
would note, are primarily engaged in an academic program and are not
employees of the team. The sports are part of a group of student activities
that are parts of campus life, rather than ends in themselves.
Because the question of whether college sports are of a type with
professional sports within the meaning of the regulation is far from clear, it
would seem that, to advance the purposes of the fragmentation rule, if the
revenue from televising big-time college sports were considered to be UBI,
it would be prudent for the IRS to issue a revenue procedure—or possibly
even promulgate additional material in the regulations—explaining its view
of what expenses might be deductible.
Another regulation may be of interest here though its relation to the
“exploited activity” rule is unclear. Treasury Regulation section 1.512(a)1(c) deals with “dual use of facilities or personnel.” In some sense, a stadium
in which a televised contest is staged is a dual use facility. As such an
allocated portion of the costs relating to the facility should be allowed as
deductions against television revenue. But the portion would be quite small.
The two or three announcers for the telecast occupy a small fraction of one
percent of the space in the facility. A few videographers stationed along the
sidelines or baseline occupy space that would not be occupied at all but for
68.
69.
70.

Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(d)(1) (2019).
Id.
Id. § 1.512(a)-1(d)(2).
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their presence, but even if one counts that space, it is still very small. Most
of the television crew is actually not in the stadium itself but in a trailer
parked in the parking lot outside the facility. So perhaps a deduction should
also be allowed for a fraction of one percent of the costs of maintaining
stadium parking lots. But all this is clearly quite trivial.
What about allocation of personnel costs? Some personnel clearly have
a close relationship to the telecasts, such as the sports information director’s
staff. Not all of their time is accounted for by television activities; of the time
that is, an appropriate allocation should be made. Again, however, the rule
relating to “exploitation of exempt activities” may bar any such allocation.71
And, again, clarification by the IRS and Treasury would be required if the
fragmentation rules are to be given meaningful effect.
Additional legislation on this point would not in our view be indicated,
but it is worth noting that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 included a
provision requiring separate accounting for each unrelated business activity
of an exempt organization in order to prohibit an organization from using
losses from one unrelated business to offset net income from another. 72
Although not directly applicable in the big-time sports context, it does
indicate Congress’s interest is limiting the ability of an exempt organization
to cause its net income to disappear by expenses or losses involved in aspects
of its operations other than the unrelated business in question.
3. Cable/Satellite Subscription Payments
To this point, no mention has been made of the fact that networks also
receive revenue from a source other than advertising: payments from local
television cable and satellite companies. The latter have contractual
arrangements with subscribers under which monthly payments are made in
exchange for delivery of a signal by cable or satellite into the viewers’
homes. The basic rate for this service begins at around forty or fifty dollars
per month, with add-ons for additional receivers, high-definition
transmissions, optional programming, and other features. These subscription
amounts come from the pockets of the viewers and are more analogous to
the purchase of a ticket than to advertising; just as is the case with payments
for live admission to an event, they represent a payment from someone who
wants to watch athletic contests. A possible inference from these facts might
be that, to the extent that the funds that ultimately flow to universities are
derived from subscription fees rather than from advertising, they should not

71.
72.

Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(d)(1).
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 13703, § 512(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2169.
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be considered unrelated business taxable income under the fragmentation
theory just advanced.
While such an inference is not facially unreasonable, it ignores the
critical difference between live attendance and television viewing
emphasized in the discussion above of the (defective) reasoning of Revenue
Ruling 80-296: on-site viewing of events can be plausibly described as
having something to do with community building, providing social capital.73
Such a claim is not plausible in the case of a distant viewer who may have
no connection with the universities represented on the field. Indeed, such
viewers are normally not even able to select the particular games they would
like to watch, except among the limited offerings that the networks that are
part of that viewer’s subscription provide from week to week. Unlike ticket
buyers, the viewers at home are usually not even fans of the particular teams
whose games are featured on any given day. The several million viewers of
each year’s regular-season football game of the century would, for the most
part, not be enthusiasts of either school’s athletic programs; they simply want
to be entertained by what is expected to be an exciting football game
featuring players and coaches who have come to be nationally renowned.
We would, therefore, argue that the money whose source lies in
subscription income from viewers is taxable UBI for essentially the same
reason that advertising income is: it is not derived from activities that have
any reasonable relationship to the exempt purposes of the colleges and
universities that ultimately receive the economic benefits that the business
provides. The case may be marginally more difficult to sustain because the
case for UBIT treatment of advertising income draws support from Treasury
Regulations, the Internal Revenue Code, and Supreme Court precedent.
Subscription income is, nevertheless, conceptually similar to advertising
income in the sense that both come from sources too distant from the exempt
purposes of a university to be considered related to those purposes.
4. Possible Defenses to Assertion of UBIT Liability?
The law on UBI as it applies to big-time college sports contains a few
other possibly relevant aspects that should be discussed, if only briefly. The
first is the “sponsorship” controversy that swelled in the early 1990s, later to
be quelled by both a more generous view by the IRS and subsequent
legislation on this topic. In 1991 the IRS issued technical advice to the effect
that payments by commercial interests to support college football bowl

73.

See supra Sections I.C.1−.2.
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games constituted UBI. 74 Though identifying information was redacted, it
was widely known that the particular bowls were the Mobil Cotton Bowl and
the John Hancock Bowl, and the IRS position came to be known as the
“Cotton Bowl ruling.”75
This position created a backlash, and the IRS ultimately backed down. 76
Congress secured a limited exemption for sponsorship gifts in § 513(i). It is
possible to imagine that the sponsorship exemption could be used in lieu of
some advertising as a means of avoiding UBI if that concept were held to
apply to television revenue generated by big-time sports. However, the rules
of § 513(i) seem flatly inconsistent with the type of advertising commonly
seen in telecasts of big-time sports. The prevailing preferences of advertisers
are not of the general form of “[t]his broadcast was brought to you by the
generous contributions of Nike, Gatorade, Budweiser, and Ford Trucks.”
Rather, sponsors seem to prefer making a direct pitch about the desirability
of their products. As Yogi Berra supposedly said, “It’s hard to make
predictions, especially about the future”;77 nevertheless, it seems likely that
advertisers and big-time sports would conclude that, if necessary, it would
be better to pay some amount of UBIT than give up the opportunity to offer
conventional advertising in connection with broadcasts. Big-time sports have
become one of the primary means of putting messages in front of young,
especially male, audiences, and it seems unlikely that the UBIT would much
deter advertisers from this mission.
Also, to be noted is that the one attempt of the IRS to impose the UBIT
on advertising in connection with college sports was unsuccessful. In NCAA
v. Commissioner, the IRS sought to tax the advertising income generated by
the magazine-like “program” published by the NCAA in connection with its
annual Division I basketball tournament. 78 Though the IRS prevailed at the
Tax Court level, the decision was reversed by the Tenth Circuit.79 One might
well ask whether the IRS, having been rebuffed when it stuck a toe in these
waters, can reasonably hope for better results if it were to jump headfirst in
the manner suggested in this Article.
There is every reason to think that it could get better results. Not only
did the IRS win at the trial level in NCAA but the NCAA also conceded that

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991).
JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 628 (4th ed. 2010).
Id.
But he also said that he never said a lot of the things he said, so who knows?
NCAA v. Comm’r, 914 F.2d 1417, 1418 (10th Cir. 1990).
NCAA v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 456, 470 (1989), rev’d, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990).
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sale of the advertising was unrelated and constituted a business. 80 The only
missing element from a good UBIT case as found by the court was that the
activity was not “regularly carried on.”81 This was barely debatable in the
case of an annual, three-week basketball tournament but could hardly be
debatable in the case of the regular seasons for college football and
basketball, which extend, respectively, from August through January and
from October through April of every year. If anything, the language of the
opinion in this case supports the argument offered in this Article.
Finally, if one takes seriously the idea that big-time sports are conducted
by amateur student-athletes, one must consider whether the general
exemption from UBIT for activities conducted by unpaid volunteers might
apply to big-time sports.82 Without even going to the question of whether the
student-athletes play “without compensation” 83 despite the fact that they
receive scholarships that may be worth $60,000 or $70,000 per year (at
private universities), one notes that the athletic contests inevitably involve a
cadre of coaches, trainers, athletic directors and their staffs, numbering in the
dozens. These individuals are clearly not volunteers and, in the cases of the
head coaches and athletic directors, are typically the highest-paid employees
of their institutions. This exemption would seem flatly unavailable in this
context.
5. Prospects for Reform
Needless to say, universities are not likely to voluntarily declare taxable
UBI from televised big-time sports events especially in light of the fact that
Revenue Ruling 80-296 explicitly exempts such revenue from the tax.
Further action from the IRS would be necessary to collect such a tax. Is this
feasible?
It is certainly possible. The IRS does occasionally revoke earlier
rulings, and in those cases, it usually replaces them with new rulings that
reflect more contemporary facts and current analyses. Revoking Revenue
Ruling 80-296 would be a good idea and entirely defensible both on grounds
that it was defective ab initio and on grounds that the truly stupefying
infusions of revenue that big-time sports have begun to generate could not
have been anticipated at the time the ruling was published. No changes in
statutes or regulations would seem to be required to implement the view that

80.
81.
82.
83.

NCAA, 914 F.2d at 1421.
Id. at 1424.
I.R.C. § 513(a)(1) (2018).
Id.
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television contracts generate taxable UBI since § 513(c) and its
accompanying regulations already point to such a result, as argued above. 84
Is the IRS likely to revoke Revenue Ruling 80-296, and if it does, is it
likely to be able to sustain a position contrary to that ruling? As to the first,
it certainly seems doubtful, especially in the short run. The IRS has limited
political capital even in the best of times, and these are not the best of times.
And the impetus for this action would presumably be initiated by the division
with primary responsibility for exempt organizations, and that division is
currently in a state of (largely undeserved) disgrace. So in the short run, do
not expect this scenario to be playing out anytime soon at a big-screen sports
bar near you.
But it may be worth bringing these arguments to the attention of the IRS
as part of a sustained campaign that might eventually lead it to reconsider
Revenue Ruling 80-296. The revenue involved—unlike that which is at stake
in most UBIT controversies—is substantial and growing at a remarkable
rate. It would seem that it would be healthy, for both tax revenues and for
colleges and universities themselves, for the IRS to take a more realistic view
of whether televised big-time sports are really related to the exempt purposes
of a university.
If the IRS were eventually persuaded to take the view advocated here,
it would probably be able to sustain that view in court, in view of strong
Supreme Court precedent for disaggregation of advertising revenue from the
otherwise exempt activity that provided the platform for it. And although
Congress has generally been friendly to big-time college sports, it might be
that Congress would decide not to intervene as long as it did not see the IRS
action as imperiling the basic idea of big-time sports. Indeed, the recent
repeal of § 170(l) suggests a changing mood in Congress that would not be
inimical to the idea that television revenues could be considered UBI.
There is no reason to think that taxing television revenues received
indirectly by colleges and universities as UBI would seriously damage
college sports. Indeed, it might enhance competition. Only the most
successful programs would generate enough revenue to have substantial net
income from these activities. As every income tax inevitably is, this tax
would be to some degree a tax on success and would reduce, by about a fifth,
the after-tax returns from that success. This, in turn, would lead to less money
going into the most successful programs, which would mean that they would
likely be unable to spend quite so much on coaching staffs, recruiting costs,

84.

See supra Section I.C.3.

2019]

THE NCAA AND THE IRS

1115

lavish facilities, and so on. Would that be such a bad thing? It would probably
have the effect of improving the competitive relationships between the most
successful programs and the others in the same conference, thereby,
enhancing rather than damaging college sports.
II. THE EXCLUSION OF ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS FROM GROSS
INCOME (ACCORDING TO THE IRS)
For a scholarship to be excludable from gross income under § 117, it
must not constitute “payment for . . . services by the student required as a
condition for receiving the . . . scholarship.”85 An informed observer of bigtime college sports might conclude that athletic scholarships must then be
taxable, because they are obviously awarded as compensation for playing
big-time sports. The observer would be wrong, however, at least in the sense
that everyone involved—the universities, the student-athletes, and the IRS
itself—takes the position that athletic scholarships qualify for the § 117
exclusion. But the observer might be right in a different sense because there
is a strong argument that everyone involved is wrong.
A. EARLY ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS
Before explaining that argument, we begin with some historical
background. Athletic scholarships predate by several decades the 1913
introduction of the federal individual income tax. As Professors Allen Sack
and Ellen Staurowksy have recounted, athletic scholarships were common at
American colleges and universities as early as the 1880s.86 A landmark 1929
study sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation reported that some form of
financial subsidy for varsity athletes—sometimes labeled as scholarships,
sometimes not—existed at eighty-one of the colleges and universities
studied. 87
From its founding in 1906 until 1947, the NCAA opposed the granting
of athletic scholarships as inconsistent with its principles of amateurism—
although that did not stop numerous member schools from awarding them. 88
In 1947 the NCAA adopted what quickly became known as the “Sanity
Code” as an attempted compromise between member schools in favor of
athletic scholarships (largely, but not exclusively, schools in the South) and
schools opposed to athletic scholarships (including the members of the Ivy
85.
86.
87.

I.R.C. § 117(c)(1).
ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR H IRE 23–24 (1998).
HOWARD J. SAVAGE ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING,
AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 241 (1929).
88. SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra note 86, at 42.
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League and the Big Ten). 89 The Sanity Code permitted schools to award
financial aid on the basis of athletic ability but provided that aid could not be
withdrawn if a recipient decided to quit the team. 90 The Sanity Code became
a dead letter just three years after its adoption when a vote to expel seven
schools from the NCAA for open noncompliance with the Code fell short of
the requisite supermajority.91 Between the de facto end of the Sanity Code
and 1956, there was no meaningful NCAA regulation of athletic
scholarships.92 This was the situation in 1954 when Congress enacted § 117
of the Internal Revenue Code, providing for the first time a clear statutory
basis for the exclusion of scholarships from gross income.
B. ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS AND THE INCOME TAX BEFORE AND AFTER
1954
Before Congress enacted the § 117 scholarship exclusion in 1954,
nothing in the Internal Revenue Code directly addressed the income tax
status of scholarships, athletic or otherwise. As the Supreme Court noted in
its 1969 opinion Bingler v. Johnson, prior to 1954 scholarships were taxable
unless they qualified as excludable gifts under the predecessor to § 102.93
Pre-1954 Supreme Court interpretations of the gift exclusion were certainly
sufficient to cast doubt on the excludability of athletic scholarships. In
various cases, the Court pronounced that a “payment for services, even
though entirely voluntary,” was not a gift; 94 a payment motivated by
“anticipated benefit” to the payor was not a gift;95 and a payment made “in
return for services rendered” was likewise not a gift.96 There was no pre1954 law directly on point, however, because the IRS had never asserted the
taxability of athletic scholarships—or of any other scholarships, for that
matter.
Before the lowering of exemption levels during World War II converted
the income tax from a class tax to a mass tax, the IRS’s somnolence in this
area might have been excused by the fact that few scholarships would have
generated income tax liabilities for their recipients, even in the absence of
the gift exclusion’s safe haven. In 1936, for example, when the personal
89. WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT 67–70 (1995);
SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra note 86, at 44.
90. SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra note 86, at 44.
91. BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 89, at 67–68; SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra note 86, at 46.
92. BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 89, at 68.
93. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 752–53 (1969).
94. Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 730 (1929).
95. Bogardus v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).
96. Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 713–14 (1952).
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exemption amount for a single person was $1,000,97 a full-ride scholarship
(tuition plus room and board) at the University of Pennsylvania (presumably
one of the more expensive universities in the country then, as it is now)
would have been valued at less than the income tax exemption amount. 98 Of
course a scholarship might have been taxable to a scholarship recipient with
significant income from other sources, but the tax dollars at stake with
respect to scholarships prior to World War II must have been trivial or nearly
so. By the early 1950s, however, it would have been more difficult to invoke
the personal exemption to excuse the IRS’s continued lack of attention to the
tax status of scholarships. In 1953, for example, the personal exemption for
a single person was $600,99 while a full-ride scholarship at Penn was worth
more than $1,600.100 After claiming both the $600 personal exemption and
a standard deduction of $160 (the lesser of $1,000 or ten percent of adjusted
gross income), the recipient of a taxable scholarship of $1,600 would have
had $840 of taxable income, even assuming no additional income from other
sources.
Although the IRS continued to ignore the income tax status of
scholarships in the early years of the mass tax era, Congress finally turned
its attention to the issue in 1954. Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 provided, for the first time, a clear statutory basis for the exclusion
of scholarships from gross income. 101 Under § 117(a)(1) gross income did
not include any amount received as a scholarship at an educational
institution.102 Although the statute did not define “scholarship,” § 117(b)(1)
specified that the exclusion did not apply to “that portion of any amount
received which represents payment for teaching, research, or other services
in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to receiving
97. Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters 1918 to 2019, TAX POL’ Y CTR. (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-individual-income-tax-parameters.
98. Mark Frazier Lloyd with Nicholas G. Heavens, Tuition and Mandatory Fees, Room and Board,
and Other Educational Costs at Penn 1930–1939, U. PA.: U. ARCHIVES & RECS. CTR. (2003),
https://archives.upenn.edu/exhibits/penn-history/tuition/tuition-1930-1939 (last visited Aug. 6, 2019)
(noting that the University of Pennsylvania charged $400 for undergraduate tuition, $11 in mandatory
fees, and $520 for room and board in 1936).
99. Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters 1918 to 2019, supra note 97. In addition to the
personal exemption, a single taxpayer was entitled to a standard deduction equal to the lesser of $1,000
or 10 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.
100. Mark Frazier Lloyd with Nicholas G. Heavens, Tuition and Mandatory Fees, Room and Board,
and Other Educational Costs at Penn 1950–1959, U. PA.: U. ARCHIVES & RECS. CTR. (2003),
https://archives.upenn.edu/exhibits/penn-history/tuition/tuition-1950-1959 (noting that the University of
Pennsylvania charged $700 for undergraduate tuition, $85 in mandatory fees, and $835 for room and
board in 1953).
101. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, c. 736, § 117, 68A Stat. 38.
102. Id. § 117(a)(1).
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the scholarship . . . .”103 In light of this limitation on the exclusion, the tax
status of athletic scholarships remained uncertain. Despite the fact that
athletic scholarships were common in 1954, there was no discussion at any
point in the legislative process resulting in the 1954 Code—not in the House
and Senate hearings, not in the committee reports, and not in the floor
debates—of the application (or nonapplication) of new § 117 to athletic
scholarships. The closest thing to a contemporaneous interpretation appeared
in a 1956 article by tax professor John Chommie:
Normally services are not demanded in return for a scholarship, which is
usually an undergraduate grant-in-aid. Therefore, few problems are
anticipated here. This would seem to be true even in the case of the athletic
scholarship, though the sophisticate may be skeptical here, where service
on an athletic team may be an express or implied condition.
It is extremely doubtful that this flow of benefits was intended to be
embraced within the limits of Section 117(b)(1). In short, there seems to
be little reason in drawing a distinction between athletic and academic
performance often demanded as a condition of a scholarship grant.104

Although the IRS remained silent on the issue, its inactivity suggested it
agreed with Chommie’s conclusion.
C. THE NCAA REVISES ITS SCHOLARSHIP RULES
As noted earlier, since 1951 there was no meaningful national
regulation of athletic scholarships on the books of the NCAA. That changed
in 1956 when the NCAA Convention amended the organization’s rules to
permit member schools to pay all “commonly accepted educational
expenses” of their student-athletes without regard to either need or academic
potential. 105 The NCAA rules of the late 1950s also specified that an athletic
scholarship could be awarded for up to four years and that, once awarded, a
scholarship could not be rescinded because the student quit the team. 106
Although the rule stating that a student who quit the team did not forfeit his
scholarship was not tax driven, it did not necessarily reflect high-mindedness
on the part of the NCAA and its members. Rather, the primary motivation
for the rule seems to have been not the making of a principled stand for
amateurism but the desire of member schools to avoid worker’s
compensation liability for injured players.107
103. Id. § 117(b)(1).
104. John C. Chommie, Services Rendered, Not Donative Intent, Governs Exemption of Study
Grants, 4 J. TAX’N 375, 375−76 (1956).
105. BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 89, at 72.
106. Id. at 72–73
107. Id. at 69–70; MICHAEL ORIARD, BOWLED O VER 130 (2009); SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra
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Throughout the late 1950s and all of the 1960s, the IRS continued to
pay zero attention to the tax status of athletic scholarships. Although there is
no indication that qualifying athletic scholarships for exclusion under § 117
played the slightest role in the NCAA’s formulation of its scholarship rules
during this period, a strong case could have been made—at least until 1967—
that athletic scholarships issued in compliance with NCAA rules also
satisfied § 117. If a student-athlete who was awarded a four-year scholarship
at entrance could quit the team in his first year and keep his scholarship for
all four years, it would have been reasonable to conclude that his scholarship
was not disqualified by § 117(b)(1) as “payment . . . in the nature of parttime employment . . . .”108
In 1967 the NCAA changed its scholarship rules to permit immediate
termination of financial aid for fraudulent misrepresentation by a student in
connection with his application for an athletic scholarship. 109 If, after having
been awarded an athletic scholarship, a student never showed up for practice
or made only a few token appearances, the school could treat that as evidence
of fraudulent misrepresentation by the student in his scholarship application
and could cancel the scholarship without delay. 110 Professors Sack and
Staurowsky have persuasively characterized the 1967 amendment as
allowing the NCAA to “have it both ways” as to the effect of voluntary
nonparticipation on athletic scholarships. 111 Although the NCAA rules still
stated that an athletic scholarship could not be forfeited when a player quit a
team, the rules also contemplated that—at least in some cases—quitting a
team could be sufficient evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation to justify
immediate loss of scholarship. Although the tax-exempt character of athletic
scholarships looked considerably shakier after the NCAA rule change, the
IRS gave no indication that it was paying attention.
In 1972 the NCAA—clearly not at all concerned about possible income
tax implications of its scholarship rules—took the further step of permitting
the cancellation of an athletic scholarship, even in the absence of fraudulent
misrepresentation, if a student “voluntarily withdr[ew] from a sport for his
own personal reasons”—although in that case the cancellation could not take
effect until the conclusion of the academic year in which the student quit the
note 86, at 48.
108. See SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra note 86, at 79–80 (concluding—albeit not with reference to
§ 117—that “for the most part, the scholarships that existed before 1967 did not constitute employment
contracts”).
109. Allen Sack, The Evolution of Professional College Sport in the United States, in GLOBAL
CORRUPTION REPORT: SPORT 293, 294 (Gareth Sweeney & Kelly McCarthy eds., 2016).
110. Id.; SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra note 86, at 83.
111. SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra note 86, at 83.
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team. 112
Neither the 1967 nor the 1972 amendment solved the problem of a fouryear scholarship wasted (from the coach’s point of view) on a player who
remained on the team but proved to be an athletic disappointment. Although
NCAA rules permitted four-year scholarships, they did not prohibit
scholarship awards for shorter periods. Thus, a school could have largely
avoided this problem by awarding renewable one-year scholarships (and not
renewing the scholarships of underperforming athletes), but that would have
put the school at a recruiting disadvantage relative to other schools offering
four-year scholarships. To solve that problem, in 1973 the NCAA approved
a rule mandating that athletic scholarships be awarded for no more than one
year at a time.113 Writing in 2009, Professor Michael Oriard viewed the 1973
ban on multi-year athletic scholarships as “a crucial event in the history of
college football’s fundamental contradiction and the foundation for the
football world that has developed since then.”114 Professor Oriard described
the 1973 rule change as “absolutely put[ting] the lie to all pretenses about
the primary importance of student-athletes. How can academics be the
highest priority if a scholarship is contingent on satisfying the football
coach?”115
D. THE IRS AWAKENS (BUT NOT FULLY)
Also in the early 1970s, for the first time ever, the IRS was forced to
pay some attention to the status of athletic scholarships under § 117. In Tax
Court cases decided in 1971 and 1974, professional athletes who had
received athletic scholarships while in college attempted to take advantage
of the (later repealed) income-averaging provisions to reduce the tax rates
applicable to their professional salaries. 116 Under the income-averaging
rules, taxpayers would qualify for averaging only if they provided at least
half of their support during each of the four preceding years. The
professional athletes argued they had furnished most of their own support
during their college years by earning their athletic scholarships. That
argument was in considerable tension with the tax-exempt status of the
scholarships under § 117, but the statute of limitations had expired for the

112. Harry M. Cross, The College Athlete and the Institution, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151,
166 n.45 (1973) (citation omitted).
113. BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 89, at 163–64; SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra note 86, at 84.
114. ORIARD, supra note 107, at 128.
115. Id. at 140.
116. Frost v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 488, 488 (1974); Heidel v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 95, 95 (1971). These
cases are discussed in Kaplan, supra note 53, at 1461–62.
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scholarship years (when the athletes had taken the position that the
scholarships were tax exempt). The Tax Court, rejecting the athletes’
attempts to have it both ways, held that tax-exempt scholarships could not
be considered as self-support.117 In 1975 the IRS followed up on the two
cases by issuing a revenue ruling holding that tax-exempt scholarships
(athletic or otherwise) did not qualify as self-support for income-averaging
purposes.118
Throughout this income-averaging saga, neither the IRS nor the Tax
Court had challenged the tax-exempt status of athletic scholarships. 119
Perhaps concerned that colleges and student-athletes would wrongly
conclude from the saga that there were no limitations whatsoever on the taxexempt status of athletic scholarships,120 the IRS finally issued guidance on
the question—first in a 1976 private letter ruling (“PLR”) and then in a 1977
revenue ruling.
The 1976 PLR stated that the university requesting the ruling (the
identity of which was redacted) awarded athletic scholarships one year at a
time (“An athletic scholarship is awarded for a given academic year”) and
that once a scholarship is awarded “it cannot be terminated, even if the
recipient unilaterally decides not to participate in intercollegiate
athletics.”121 The stated facts were consistent with NCAA scholarship rules
as of the February 1976 issue date of the ruling. Under the 1972 revision of
the NCAA rules, cancellation of a scholarship for voluntary nonparticipation
could not take effect until the conclusion of the academic year; and under the
1973 revision, an athletic scholarship could not be awarded for more than a
single academic year.122 The combined effect of the two revisions was that a
scholarship could not be cancelled for nonparticipation, despite the fact that
the cancellation rule—a relic of the era of the four-year scholarship—read in
isolation indicated that scholarships could be cancelled for nonparticipation.
Although the PLR correctly stated the bottom line of the NCAA rules, it did
not explain the peculiar mechanism by which the rules produced that

117. Frost, 61 T.C. at 295–96; Heidel 56 T.C. at 104–05.
118. Rev. Rul. 75-40, 1975-1 C.B. 276.
119. In Heidel the Court commented that “if we accept the premise that the grant-in-aid was
received by petitioner in return for services as a football player . . . , it would not qualify as an amount
received as a scholarship, and excludable from income.” Heidel, 56 T.C. at 104. However, the Court did
not accept the premise. Id.
120. Professor Richard Kaplan, writing just a few years after the events described in the text,
suggested this was the motivation for the IRS’s issuance of guidance. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 1461–62.
121. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7602120620A (Feb. 12, 1976).
122. NCAA, 1976-77 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION art. 3-1(g)-(2), at 9, art. 3-4-(b), at 14 (1976) [hereinafter 1976-77 Manual].
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result.123 The PLR framed the § 117 question as whether the recipient of an
athletic scholarship was “performing services for the university, or
participating in part of the university’s overall educational program . . . .”124
In concluding that the university’s athletic scholarships qualified as taxexempt scholarships, the PLR noted that the fact that a scholarship would
not be cancelled because of a student-athlete’s “unilateral decision not to
participate” was an “important” factor in the analysis. 125
The PLR’s analysis, although defensible on the stated facts, had some
obvious weaknesses, starting with its rather head-in-the-sand attitude toward
the realities of big-time college sports, even as of the 1970s.126 The PLR can
also be criticized for failing to mention (let alone to consider the tax
implications of) the immediate cancellation of scholarships for “fraudulent
misrepresentation” evidenced by little or nothing more than a failure to show
up for practice. Perhaps most dubiously, the PLR attached no significance to
the fact that scholarships were awarded only on a year-by-year basis despite
the fact that four years of study were required for a student-athlete to earn a
degree. The PLR might have taken the position—supported both by logic
and by the pre-1973 NCAA rules—that the natural term of an undergraduate
scholarship is four years, that what the NCAA described as nonrenewal of a
single-year scholarship for voluntary nonparticipation was in reality the
cancellation of a four-year scholarship, and that an award contingent on
participation did not qualify for exclusion under § 117.127 By failing to take
that position, the PLR implied, strangely enough, that the NCAA had
solidified the tax-exempt status of athletic scholarships by its 1973 switch
from cancellable four-year scholarships to formally noncancellable one-year
scholarships—despite the fact that the switch actually strengthened the
connection between scholarships and athletic participation. On the other
hand, the PLR’s ready acceptance of the one-year scholarship model is
understandable in the light of the tremendous significance generally attached

123. The 1976 rules also featured the rule (introduced in 1967) permitting immediate cancellation
of a scholarship for fraudulent misrepresentation, although the PLR did not mention that rule. 1976-77
Manual, supra note 122, art. 3-1-(g)-(2), at 9.
124. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7602120620A (Feb. 12, 1976).
125. Id.
126. For a contrary and roughly contemporaneous analysis of athletic scholarships under § 117,
based on the view that “intercollegiate sports have become a business venture” and “that athletic
scholarships are presently ‘pay for play,’” see Gary C. Randall, Athletic Scholarships and Taxes: Or a
Touchdown in Taxes, 7 GONZ. L. REV. 297, 297 (1972).
127. For a later statement of this position, see Adam Hoeflich, The Taxation of Athletic
Scholarships: A Problem of Consistency, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 596 (stating that the regulations under
§ 117 do not anticipate “that the student-athlete’s collegiate life will be split into a series of short term
contracts, each of which the student must fulfill to guarantee continuing aid”).
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to the annual accounting period under the federal income tax. 128
Thinking the question addressed in the PLR was of wide enough interest
to justify a revenue ruling (applicable to all universities and to all studentathletes, rather than only to the university and student-athletes described in
the PLR), in July 1977 the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 77-263. 129 The
Ruling’s statement of facts was essentially the same as the PLR’s: once a
scholarship had been awarded for a given academic year, it could not be
cancelled because the recipient quit the team. 130 Citing Treas. Reg. § 1.1174(c) for the proposition that a grant does not qualify as a tax-free scholarship
if it represents compensation or payment for services, the Ruling concluded
that the described athletic scholarships qualified under § 117 because “the
university requires no particular activity of any of its scholarship
recipients.”131
In addition to being subject to all the objections applicable to the PLR,
the Ruling introduced two new problems. First, by describing a university
that “expects but does not require the students [awarded athletic
scholarships] to participate in a particular sport,”132 the Ruling inadvertently
suggested a conflict between its analysis and that of the Supreme Court in its
1969 decision in Bingler—the only case in which the Court interpreted §
117.133 As explained immediately below, the conflict relates to whether a
mere expectation (as contrasted with a contractual obligation) that a
scholarship recipient would perform services in exchange for a grant would
be enough to render the grant taxable. The taxpayers in that case were
employees of Westinghouse Electric who were granted “educational leave”
to pursue doctoral studies, received cash stipends and tuition benefits from
Westinghouse while on leave, and were required to return to work at
Westinghouse for at least two years following the conclusion of their
studies. 134 The Court upheld the validity of the statement in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.117-4(c) that amounts received as “compensation” were not tax-exempt
scholarships and concluded that all amounts received by the taxpayers were
taxable as compensation. 135 In reaching that conclusion, the Court placed
particular weight on the fact that the taxpayers were “obligated to return to
Westinghouse’s employ for a substantial period of time after completion of
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931).
Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 744 n.7, 756–58 (1969).
Id. at 742–45.
Id. at 756–58.
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their leave.” 136 In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that one of the
taxpayers was not required to commit in writing to postleave employment
with Westinghouse but that he was “formally advised . . . that he was
‘expected’ to return to Westinghouse . . . and he in fact honored that
obligation.”137 Beyond the mention in the footnote, the Court made nothing
of the distinction between the employees who had signed written agreements
requiring them to return and the one employee who was merely “expected”
to return. In the text of the opinion, the Court twice described all the
taxpayers as “obligated” to return.138
Under one plausible reading of the opinion, the Court interpreted § 117
and the regulations as drawing no distinction between a contractually
enforceable quid pro quo arrangement and a mere expectation (or moral
commitment) that the recipient would perform services in exchange for the
grant; no less than an enforceable contract, an expectation of services would
result in taxation of the grant.139 The Ruling does not mention this aspect of
Bingler and thus does not consider the possibility that, under the Court’s
analysis, the mere fact that a student-athlete is expected but not required to
play is fatal to qualification under § 117. On the other hand, to read Bingler
as equating mere expectations to contractual commitments puts a great deal
of weight on a point raised by the Court in a footnote and even then only in
a way open to more than one interpretation. Rather than equating
expectations with enforceable obligations, the Court may have meant only
that an enforceable obligation may exist in the absence of a written
agreement; that interpretation is suggested by the fact that the footnote
describes the taxpayer who was “expected” to return as having an
“obligation” to do so. 140 Under that interpretation of the case, the expectation
that a student-athlete would play would not trigger taxation of his grant as
long as the expectation did not create a legal obligation to play. In short,
although the Ruling should have addressed the implications of expectations
of performance under the Court’s analysis, it might reasonably have
concluded that expectations without obligations did not result in taxation.
The second new problem with the Ruling was more serious; in fact, it
made the Ruling factually obsolete from the day it was issued. At its 1976

136. Id. at 757.
137. Id. at 744 n.7.
138. Id. at 743–44, 757.
139. For a statement of this position, see Michael Schinner, Note, Touchdowns and Taxes: Are
Athletic Scholarships Merely Disguised Compensation?, 8 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 127, 147 (1989) (citing
MacDonald v. Comm’r, 52 T.C. 386 (1969)).
140. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 744 n.7.
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meeting—held after the issuance of the PLR but before the issuance of the
Revenue Ruling 77-263—the NCAA revised its rules to give substance to
the right of schools to cancel scholarships for voluntary nonparticipation.
Instead of stating that such a cancellation could not take effect until the end
of the academic year (and thus could not really take effect at all given the
one-year rule), the 1976 revision stated that cancellation for quitting the team
could take place as early as the end of the current term (quarter or
semester).141 Thus, a student who quit could lose as much as two-thirds of a
one-year scholarship under a quarter system or as much as one-half under a
semester system. This change in the NCAA rules is decidedly not reflected
in Revenue Ruling 77-263, which states that the single-year scholarships
cannot be cancelled for voluntary nonparticipation. Apparently the drafters
of the Ruling worked from the facts of the PLR without bothering to check
whether those facts had changed in the months between the two
pronouncements.
Commenting on Revenue Ruling 77-263 in 1980, Professor Kaplan
took the Ruling to imply that athletic scholarships differing from those
described in the Ruling were taxable: “Presumably, therefore, the [IRS] will
tax athletic scholarships whenever the recipient is required, and not merely
expected, to participate in college sports.” 142 In other words, Professor
Kaplan interpreted the Ruling as indicating that under the actual NCAA
scholarship rules as of 1977 (albeit rules of which neither the IRS nor he was
aware) athletic scholarships were taxable. Although some commentators in
more recent decades have noted that the NCAA rules are no longer consistent
with the facts stated in the Ruling,143 no one has previously pointed out that
the NCAA rules were not consistent with the facts of the Ruling even on the
day it was issued.144
It is easy enough to understand how the IRS failed to notice the
discrepancy; the drafters of Revenue Ruling 77-263 assumed that the NCAA
rules had not changed in the short time between the PLR and the Ruling. But
what about the NCAA and the universities? Although many NCAA officials,
athletic directors, and university counsels may have merely noted the
141. 1976-77 Manual, supra note 122, art. 3-1-(g)-(2), at 9.
142. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 1462 (footnote omitted).
143. See, e.g., Daniel Nestel, Note, Athletic Scholarships: An Imbalance of Power Between the
University and the Student-Athlete, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1414 (1992); see also infra text accompanying
note 160 for further discussion.
144. To be sure, the revised NCAA rules did not prohibit member schools from awarding athletic
scholarships under the terms described in Revenue Ruling 77-263. In the rather unlikely event that any
universities continued to award scholarships on those terms after the NCAA rule change, those
scholarships would have been legitimately excluded under Revenue Ruling 77-263.
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conclusion of the Ruling without comparing the stated facts with the actual
NCAA rules, it is hard to imagine that no one within the NCAA and its
hundreds of member schools noticed the discrepancy and realized the Ruling
was not worth the paper on which it was written. The obvious fix would have
been to undo the 1976 rules change and reinstate the rule that one-year
scholarships could not be cancelled for nonparticipation. Although that
change would have imposed some scholarship costs on member schools,
there is no reason to think it would have been catastrophic—after all, schools
had operated under that very rule for several years without disaster striking.
Apparently, however, anyone who noticed the discrepancy decided the fix
could be delayed until the time—if ever—that the IRS realized that Revenue
Ruling 77-263 was based on a nonexistent state of affairs.
E. CHANGES IN THE TAX LAWS AND NCAA RULES SINCE REVENUE
RULING 77-263
In 1986 Congress made a number of changes to § 117 (including some
tweaking of the language providing that compensation for services cannot
qualify as a tax-free scholarship), 145 but the only change of substance with
implications for athletic scholarships was the elimination of the tax
exemption for the room-and-board portion of a “full-ride” scholarship
(athletic or otherwise).146 Since 1986 athletes, as well as recipients of fullride academic scholarships, have been taxable, in theory, on the room-andboard portions of their scholarships. That taxability has been, however,
largely theoretical. In its Bluebook describing the 1986 Act, the Joint
Committee on Taxation explained that, “[u]nder the Act, the IRS is not
required to exercise its authority to require information reporting by grantors
of scholarship[s]” with respect to noncompensatory room-and-board
scholarship benefits.147 Instead, “[t]he Congress anticipated that the IRS will
carefully monitor the extent of compliance by grant recipients with the new
rules and will provide for appropriate information reporting if necessary to
accomplish compliance.”148 In Notice 87-31, the IRS announced both that it
would not require information reporting for room-and-board scholarships
(other than scholarships representing compensation for services) and that it
would not treat such scholarships as wages subject to payroll taxation under

145. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 123, § 117, 100 Stat. 2085, 2112 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 117 (2018)).
146. Id.
147. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 44 (Comm. Print 1987).
148. Id.
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Code § 3101 and § 3111. 149 The information reporting exemption was
promulgated as promised in the Notice and remains in the regulations
today.150
Thus, universities and other grantors of full-ride scholarships do not
notify the IRS of the existence or amount of the room-and-board portions of
those scholarships, nor are they under any obligation to inform the recipients
of the taxable status of those portions. No one knows what percentage of the
total of room-and-board scholarships are voluntarily reported by recipients
on their federal income tax returns, but the percentage is unlikely to be high.
In 2019 the value of a full room-and-board scholarship would be in the
neighborhood of the $12,200 standard deduction amount.151 A recipient of
such a scholarship with no other taxable income would owe very little or no
income tax, but the tax liability associated with a (very possibly unreported)
room-and-board scholarship could be substantial if the recipient had taxable
income from another source (such as a summer job). The tax liability on a
room-and-board scholarship could also be substantial, even in the absence of
income from other sources, if the recipient qualified as a tax dependent of
his or her parents and so was allowed a standard deduction limited to the
lesser of (1) $1,100 or (2) the sum of $350 and the individual’s earned
income. 152
Has the IRS met Congress’s expectation that it would “carefully
monitor the extent of compliance by grant recipients with the new rules,”
and concluded that information reporting is not “necessary to accomplish
compliance”? If it has, the evidence of that effort has somehow escaped our
attention. In short recipients of full-ride athletic scholarships, along with
recipients of full-ride academic scholarships, continue to enjoy a de facto
exclusion for the room-and-board portions of their scholarships more than
three decades after Congress eliminated the legal basis for the exclusion.
Recent developments, however, suggest that at least some recipients of
room-and-board scholarships (athletic or academic) have been dutifully
reporting their scholarships as income. As amended in 2017, the so-called
kiddie tax now generally taxes unearned income of college students (among
other subjects of the kiddie tax) at the top marginal rate of 37 percent, rather
149. I.R.S. Notice 87-31, 1987-1 C.B. 475.
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3(n) (2019).
151. I.R.C. § 63(c)(7)(A)(ii) (2018); Rev. Proc. 2018-57, 2018-49 I.R.B. 827 (setting forth the
inflation adjustment for 2019).
152. I.R.C. § 63(c)(5); Rev. Proc. 2018-57, 2018-49 IRB 827. Because a room-and-board
scholarship, although taxable, is not considered compensation for services, it should not be treated as
earned income for the purpose of increasing the amount of the dependent standard deduction. I.R.S.
Notice 87-31, 1987-1 C.B. 475.
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than at their parents’ marginal tax rates as under prior law. 153 Room-andboard scholarships are considered unearned income (despite the argument to
the contrary in the case of athletic scholarships) and so are subject to the
kiddie tax. For a recipient of a room-and-board scholarship who reports the
scholarship as taxable income and whose parents are of low or moderate
income, the 2017 change in the kiddie tax imposes a significant tax
increase—an increase that Congress in 2017 did not realize it was imposing.
Higher education leaders have vociferously objected to the change and have
urged Congress to return the kiddie tax to its pre-2017 form.154 As of this
writing, the House of Representatives has passed a bill that would do exactly
that, and the prospects that the Senate will concur seem good. 155 The amount
of attention the issue has received—both in the media and in Congress—
suggests that some nontrivial number of recipients of room-and-board
scholarships are reporting the scholarships as income, despite the absence of
information reporting.
So much for post-1977 tax law developments. What about post-1977
changes in the NCAA rules? In 2012, in response to a private antitrust suit
and pressure from the Justice Department concerning the antitrust
implications of the mandatory one-year scholarship rule, 156 the NCAA
revised its rules to permit the awarding of multi-year athletic scholarships.157
Universities did not display much interest in taking advantage of the rule
change. In 2014 CBSSports.com made open-record requests of forty-three
public universities whose teams had finished in the top twenty-five in
football, men’s basketball, or both and found that out of 11,482 scholarship
athletes at those universities (in all sports, not just revenue sports), only
502—less than 5%—had multi-year scholarships.158

153. I.R.C. § 1(j)(4).
154. See, e.g., Erica L. Green, Low Income College Students Are Being Taxed Like Trust Fund
Babies, N.Y. T IMES (May 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/us/politics/college-scholar
ships-tax-increases.html.
155. H.R. 1994, 116th Cong. § 501 (as passed by House, May 23, 2019).
156. See Allen L. Sack et al., The Revival of Multiyear Scholarships in the Twenty-First Century:
Which Universities Supported and Opposed This Legislation and Why?, 7 J. ISSUES I NTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS 207, 208–10 (2014) (recounting the developments that led to the 2012 revision of the NCAA
rules); Ray Yasser, The Case for Reviving the Four-Year Deal, 86 TUL. L. REV. 987, 1004–06 (2012)
(examining the merits of the antitrust case against mandatory one-year athletic scholarships).
157. NCAA, 2017-18 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 15.3.3.1, at 203 (2017) (providing that an
athletic scholarship shall neither be awarded for a period of less than one academic year nor for a period
that would exceed the student’s five-year period of eligibility).
158. Jon Solomon, Schools Can Give Out 4-Year Athletic Scholarships, but Many Don’t, CBS
SPORTS (Sept. 16, 2014, 6:14 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/schools-can-giveout-4-year-athletic-scholarships-but-many-dont.

2019]

THE NCAA AND THE IRS

1129

The other significant difference between the NCAA scholarship rules
in 1977 and the current rules is that a school may now cancel an athletic
scholarship immediately (rather than waiting until the end of the current
term) if the recipient “[v]oluntarily (on his or her own initiative) withdraws
from a sport at any time for personal reasons” subject only to the caveat that
“the recipient’s financial aid may not be awarded to another student-athlete
in the academic term in which the aid was reduced or canceled.”159 Thus, the
stated facts in Revenue Ruling 77-263 that an athletic scholarship could not
be cancelled on account of a recipient’s decision to quit the team, which were
inconsistent with the NCAA rules in force when the Ruling was issued,
remain inconsistent with the NCAA rules of 2018. If anything the
inconsistency is a bit more glaring in 2018 because the current rules do not
protect the scholarship of the nonparticipating student for even the remainder
of the term.
F. 2014: THE IRS IGNORES THE OBVIOUS
The other difference between the situation in 1977 and the situation
today is that, to all appearances, in 1977 the IRS was honestly and
understandably mistaken in its understanding of the NCAA rules governing
the cancellation of athletic scholarships. Today, by contrast, the IRS has no
such excuse. As early as 1992, a student note in the Ohio State Law Journal
pointed out that “the assumption [in Revenue Ruling 77-263] that the
university cannot terminate the scholarship agreement upon the student’s
unilateral decision to withdraw from the athletic program does not [comport]
with the current NCAA rules.”160 It is conceivable that IRS officials do not
regularly read either the Ohio State Law Journal or the NCAA rules, and that
until recently the IRS remained unaware of—and remarkably uninquisitive
about—the actual NCAA scholarship rules. It is clear enough, however, that
by 2014 at the latest the IRS was aware that the then-current NCAA
scholarship rules were crucially different from the rules described in
Revenue Ruling 77-263.
In March of 2014, a regional director of the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB”) issued a decision concluding that Northwestern University
football players receiving athletic scholarships were employees of
Northwestern for purposes of federal labor law and were entitled to be
recognized as a bargaining unit under the National Labor Relations Act

159. NCAA, supra note 157, art. 15.3.4.2(d), at 204 (applicable to “nonautonomy” conferences);
id. art. 15.3.5.1(d), at 205 (identical language; applicable to “autonomy” conferences).
160. Nestel, supra note 143, at 1414.
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(“NLRA”).161 The decision was covered extensively in the national media 162
and generated considerable discussion in law reviews and tax specialty
journals of its implications for the tax status of athletic scholarships under
§ 117. 163 The regional director found that scholarship football players

161.
162.

Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 app. at 1356−68 (2015) .
See, e.g., Ben Strauss & Steve Eder, College Players Granted Right to Form Union, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/sports/ncaafootball/national-labor-relat
ions-board-rules-northwestern-players-are-employees-and-can-unionize.html.
163. See, e.g., Omar A. Bareentto, NCAA, It’s Time to Pay the Piper: The Aftermath of O’Bannon
v. NCAA and Northwestern v. College Athletes Players Association, 12 RUTGERS BUS . L.J. 3, 24–26
(2015) (concluding that the regional director’s decision “seriously undermines the IRS’s position with
respect to athletic scholarships”); Erik M. Jensen, Student Athletes Revisited, 32 J. TAX INV., Fall 2014,
at 50 (concluding that in light of the evidence in the Northwestern case, “the traditional justifications for
excluding the full value of athletic scholarships from gross income under Section 117 have lost most of
the force that we pretended yes, pretended that they once had”); Patrick C. Johnston, Northwestern
Football and College Athletes: Be Careful What You Wish for, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 655, 678 (2015)
(concluding that the Northwestern players might face a “heavy tax bill” if they continue down their
current NLRB path); Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, Northwestern, O’Bannon and the Future:
Cultivating a New Era for Taxing Qualified Scholarships, 49 AKRON L. REV. 771, 774 (2016) (citing
David Murphy, What Exactly Is the Long-Term Impact of the NLRB’s Decision? Part 3, D ORSEY &
WHITNEY LLP (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.dorsey.com/eu-nlrb-decision-college-athletes-and-unionspt3 (noting that a “crucial question following the original NLRB holding was whether the IRS can
logically continue to treat qualified scholarships received by student-athletes as excludable from gross
income”)); Justin Morehouse, When Play Becomes Work: Are College Athletes Employees?, 144 TAX
NOTES 1427, 1427 (2014) (suggesting that the evidence in the Northwestern case “could prompt the IRS
to reconsider the favorable tax treatment of athletic scholarships”); A.L. Spitzer, Are Student-Athletes
Winning Their Battles but Losing the (Tax) War?, 146 TAX N OTES 253, 255−56 (2015) (noting the
evidence that Northwestern could cancel a player’s athletic scholarship if he voluntarily left the team and
concluding that if universities want to protect the tax-exempt status of their athletic scholarships, it is
“most important . . . that athletic scholarships should be granted with no requirement that the studentathlete play on the team”). The references to the O’Bannon v. NCAA litigation in the titles of two of the
above-cited articles merit an explanation. In that litigation, Ed O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball
player, sued the NCAA on the theory that NCAA rules prohibiting universities from paying their studentathletes for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (for example, in video games) were a restraint
of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962–63 (N.D.
Cal. 2014), rev’d, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (2018). The tax
commentators referencing the O’Bannon litigation in their titles thought that O’Bannon, like the
Northwestern football NLRB saga, had implications for the application of § 117 to athletic scholarships.
The district court held that the NCAA rules did indeed violate the Sherman Act, enjoined the NCAA from
prohibiting full cost-of-attendance (“COA”) scholarships (covering all estimated living expenses rather
than only room and board), and also enjoined the NCAA from prohibiting its members from paying
athletes up to $5,000 per year in deferred compensation. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007–09. On appeal
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of an antitrust violation and its injunction concerning
full COA scholarships but reversed as to the injunction concerning deferred compensation. O’Bannon,
802 F.3d at 1074–79. Reacting to the legislation, the NCAA revised its rules to permit so-called autonomy
members to award full COA scholarships, with the amount determined by the granting university based
on the local cost of living. Marc Tracy, In N.C.A.A.’s Varied Landscape, Some Open Floodgates While
Others Fear Drought, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/sports/inncaas-varied-landscape-some-open-floodgates-while-others-fear-drought.html (describing the new rule
as “rais[ing] scholarship values by several thousand dollars to cover the full cost of attendance”).
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performed services for the benefit of the employer for which they received
compensation; in fact, “each player receiv[es] total compensation in excess
of one quarter of a million dollars throughout the four or five years they [sic]
perform football duties for the [university].”164 The regional director also
found that “scholarships can be immediately canceled if the player
voluntarily withdraws from the team . . . .” 165 The Northwestern football
case ended in August of 2015 when the NLRB itself, in Northwestern’s
appeal from the decision of the regional director, declined to assert
jurisdiction because it concluded that doing so would not effectuate the
purposes of the NLRB, largely because the vast majority of Northwestern’s
football competitors were public universities over which the NLRB had no
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the NLRB dismissed the players’ petition without
reaching the question of whether the players were employees for labor law
purposes.166
Two days after the regional director issued his decision in the
Northwestern case, Senator Richard Burr (Republican, North Carolina), who
had attended Wake Forest University on a football scholarship in the 1970s,
wrote to IRS Commissioner John Koskinen asking about the potential tax
implications of the decision for athletic scholarships. 167 By this time, given
the pointedness of Burr’s inquiry and the ready availability of the regional
director’s decision, the IRS in general and Commissioner Koskinen in
particular must have been aware of (or, at best, willfully ignorant of) the
critical disconnect between the facts stated in Revenue Ruling 77-263 and
the facts of athletic scholarships in 2014. Commissioner Koskinen’s reply,
however, was remarkable for its disregard of the 2014 facts; he wrote:

Although the O’Bannon litigation might have had important implications for the § 117 status of athletic
scholarships, the ultimate result of the litigation has had no significant impact. For tax purposes, the full
COA scholarship amounts are no different from the basic room-and-board scholarship amounts that have
been around forever—clearly taxable under the post-1986 version of § 117 but perhaps seldom actually
taxed.
164. 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1363.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1355−56.
167. Letter from John A. Koskinen, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv., to Richard Burr, U.S. Senate,
2014-0016 (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/14-0016.pdf [hereinafter Koskinen Letter]
(describing Senator Burr’s letter). Contrary to what one might suppose based on his inquiry, Senator Burr
favored treating athletic scholarships as tax-free and opposed the unionization of college athletes;
apparently, he wrote to Commissioner Koskinen in the hope that Koskinen would reply that scholarships
would be taxable if athletes unionized and that the prospect of taxable scholarships would cause the
Northwestern players to abandon their quest to be certified as a collective bargaining unit. See Marc
Edelman, From Student-Athletes to Employee-Athletes: Why a “Pay for Play” Model of College Sports
Would Not Necessarily Make Educational Scholarships Taxable, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1137, 1148–49 (2017).
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It has long been the position of the Internal Revenue Service that athletic
scholarships can qualify for exclusion from income under section 117.
Revenue Ruling 77-263 . . . addresses the tax treatment of athletic
scholarships where the student athlete is expected to participate in the
sport, and the scholarship is not cancelled in event the student cannot
participate and the student is not required to engage in any other activities
in lieu of participating in the sport. The ruling holds that the athletic
scholarship awarded by the university is primarily to aid the recipients in
pursuing their studies and, therefore, is excludable under section 117.168

And that was that. The implications of unionization for the income tax
treatment of athletic scholarships became a moot point when the NLRB
dismissed the Northwestern players’ petition in 2015, and the IRS has
persisted in its supreme indifference to the facts of athletic scholarships. It
does not seem possible, under the current NCAA scholarship regime, to
construct a serious argument that athletic scholarships qualify as tax-free
under § 117, because it is so clear that a scholarship cancellable for voluntary
nonparticipation constitutes compensation for services. As compensation for
services, athletic scholarships should be subject not only to the federal
income tax but also to the employer and employee federal payroll taxes. 169
And yet the only parties directly affected by the IRS’s failure to enforce
the law—the student-athletes and their universities—have no reason to
challenge the IRS’s inaction, and good-government sorts who might like to
challenge the IRS in court (intermeddling law professors, for example) lack
standing to do so.170 Given the absence of third-party standing to challenge
administrative giveaways to lucky taxpayers, the IRS is free—as a matter of
power if not of right—to disregard the dictates of the Internal Revenue Code,
as long as it does so in a taxpayer-favorable direction. As one of us has
explained in an earlier article, the IRS has a significant history of protaxpayer customary deviations of this sort. 171 Perhaps the best-known
example is the IRS’s 2002 announcement, which remains in effect today,
that it has no intention of enforcing the taxability of frequent-flier miles

168. Koskinen Letter, supra note 167.
169. I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111 (2018) (establishing employee payroll tax rate and employer payroll tax
rate). As noted earlier, payroll taxation does not follow from the taxability of noncompensatory roomand-board scholarships under the income tax. See supra text accompanying note 149. However, when the
reason a benefit fails to qualify for exclusion under § 117 is that it constitutes compensation for services,
payroll taxation will generally follow.
170. The leading cases on the lack of third-party standing on federal tax issues are Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) and Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
171. Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62
DUKE L.J. 829, 833–41 (2012).
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retained by employees resulting from employer-paid business travel. 172
In the case of athletic scholarships, the IRS’s position, as stated in
Revenue Ruling 77-263, did not start out as an intentional disregard of the
Code but as (to all appearances) an honest and understandable misstatement
of the facts. By the time of the Koskinen letter, however, the IRS could not
reasonably have escaped knowledge of the facts of athletic scholarships. By
clinging to Revenue Ruling 77-263, after it became aware that the Ruling
was based on facts very different from the actual facts of 2014, the IRS
transformed what began as an honest mistake of fact into intentional
nonenforcement.
Although the IRS’s customary deviations from the commands of the
statute are always troubling from a rule-of-law perspective, in two respects,
the IRS’s athletic scholarship nonenforcement seems worse than its frequentflier nonenforcement. First, the 2002 frequent-flier announcement at least
had the virtue of forthrightness. It said, almost in so many words, that the
IRS had decided not to enforce the law. By contrast, the 2014 Koskinen letter
said no such thing; rather than openly declaring an intention not to tax
taxable athletic scholarships, the letter concluded, by ignoring facts of which
the IRS must have been aware, that athletic scholarships are not taxable.
Second, the don’t-ask-don’t-tell policy for frequent-flier miles is
grounded in serious administrability concerns in a way that the IRS’s athletic
scholarship position is not. It is clear enough how worries about
administrability led the IRS to issue its frequent-flier announcement. As the
IRS explained, its nonenforcement policy was driven by numerous
unresolved “technical and administrative issues . . . , including issues
relating to the timing and valuation of income inclusions . . . .” 173 By
contrast there are no serious technical or administrative impediments to
taxing athletic scholarships. Determining the fair market value of the tuition
portion of an athletic scholarship could scarcely be easier; the value is equal
to the tuition charged to a nonscholarship student at the university attended
by the scholarship athlete. Rather than being based on legitimate technical
or administrative issues, the IRS’s position on athletic scholarships seems to
be based on nothing more than a concern that the IRS would catch flak from
some powerful interests if it were to enforce the law.

172. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621. For another striking example, see Revenue
Ruling 93-73, 1993-2 C.B. 75, in which the IRS effectively renounced its Supreme Court victory in
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (concerning the deductibility of Scientology auditing
fees as charitable contributions).
173. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621.
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G. WHAT TO DO?
Given this unsatisfactory state of affairs, what is to be done? At least at
first glance, it seems the IRS should issue a new revenue ruling with facts
consistent with current athletic scholarship rules and practices and a
conclusion that scholarships that can be withdrawn based on voluntary
nonparticipation are not excluded from gross income under § 117 and are
subject to the payroll taxes as well as to the income tax. (There would be no
need to withdraw Revenue Ruling 77-263 since the IRS would still reach the
same result on the assumed facts of the old ruling.) If the IRS also announced
that it would not apply the new ruling until some specified date in the future
(probably about one year from the date of the ruling), that would give the
NCAA and the universities time to conform their scholarship rules to the
requirements of the new ruling.
Just as the NCAA, in 2012, discarded its one-year scholarship rule to
solve an antitrust problem, the NCAA and the universities would almost
certainly revise their scholarship rules rather than run the risk that the IRS
would assert—and the courts would uphold—the taxability of every athletic
scholarship. The extra cost to the universities of conforming with the new
ruling would be modest since the ruling would (in keeping with the analysis
of Revenue Ruling 77-263) conclude that a single-year scholarship can
qualify under § 117 as long as it cannot be canceled for nonparticipation
before the end of the current academic year. That cost would likely be orders
of magnitude less than the costs (to both the student-athletes and the
universities) of failing to comply with the IRS’s requirements for exclusion
from gross income. If things played out this way, the final result would be
little or no increase in federal tax revenues but a modest improvement in the
rules governing athletic scholarships and the end of the IRS’s egregious
refusal to enforce the law in this area.
All in all, the above is what we think the IRS should do. There are,
however, two other approaches with enough plausibility to merit discussion.
First, the IRS could revisit not only the facts of Revenue Ruling 77-263 but
also the legal analysis by issuing a ruling holding that only noncancellable,
multi-year athletic scholarships satisfy the conditions of § 117. As discussed
above, 174 that would be a defensible—although less than compelling—
interpretation of the statute. It would be a reversal of the IRS’s long-standing
position in Revenue Ruling 77-263 that one-year scholarships are
permissible—a position based on an interpretation of the law rather than on

174.

See supra text accompanying notes 127−28.
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a misunderstanding of the facts. Both because of the reversal of longstanding policy and because a switch to guaranteed four- or five-year athletic
scholarships would be costly for universities, the IRS could expect an uproar
from the NCAA and its members if it took this position. The IRS might feel
compelled to back down, or Congress might overrule the IRS by legislation.
Even if the IRS were able to make its position stick, from a socialengineering perspective, it is far from clear that a diversion of limited
scholarship dollars from academic scholarships to athletes who quit in the
first year and keep their scholarships for the rest of their undergraduate
careers is an improvement over the status quo. In short, this is probably not
the hill for the IRS to die on.
The second possibility would be for the IRS to draw a distinction
between scholarships in revenue sports (football and men’s basketball) and
nonrevenue sports. An oddity of almost all the commentary on the tax status
of athletic scholarships is that it focuses entirely on scholarships in the two
revenue sports, generally not even acknowledging that scholarships exist in
nonrevenue sports. 175 According to the NCAA’s website, its member
schools annually provide athletic scholarships to more than 150,000 studentathletes with total scholarships valued at $3.3 billion. 176 According to an
unofficial source, annual scholarships total $175 million in Division I men’s
basketball and $409 million in the Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”).177
Apparently, less than 20 percent of all athletic scholarship dollars go to
student-athletes in the two revenue sports—a state of affairs one would never
suspect from all the tax commentary ignoring scholarships in nonrevenue
sports.
Although it is reasonable enough to conclude that any athletic
scholarship that is cancellable for nonparticipation is compensation for
services, it is easier to reach that conclusion if the sport in question is
producing millions of dollars of gross revenue for the university than if the
sport produces little or no gross revenue and is indisputably a money-loser
for the university. Neither the statute nor the regulations limit the taxability
of scholarships for services to scholarships connected with money-making
activities of the grantor.178 Nevertheless, it seems easier to conclude that a
scholarship conditioned on participation is payment for services (and is thus
taxable) when the benefit to the university of the recipient’s services is as
175. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 163.
176. Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances (last
visited Aug. 12, 2019).
177. See College Athletic Scholarship Limits 2018−19, supra note 15.
178. See I.R.C. § 117(c) (2018); Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (2019).

1136

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1087

obvious as the millions of dollars of gross revenue produced by a revenue
sport.179 According to a long-standing proposed regulation (frequently cited
in IRS memoranda), “a requirement that the recipient pursue . . . activities
primarily for the benefit of the grantor is treated as a requirement to perform
services” resulting in taxability of the scholarship. 180 While presumably a
university believes it derives benefits of some sort from its golf, softball, and
swimming teams, the benefits—whatever they may be—are considerably
subtler than the piles of cash produced by football and men’s basketball. 181
If the IRS’s interpretation of § 117 draws no distinction between
athletic scholarships in revenue and nonrevenue sports (thus concluding that
a scholarship in a nonrevenue sport is taxable if cancellable for
nonparticipation), there would be implications for some nonathletic
scholarships as well. Performing arts scholarships are commonly
conditioned on the recipient’s participation in a performing group sponsored
by the university. 182 If an athletic scholarship conditioned on participation in
a nonrevenue sport is taxable because of the condition, a similarly
conditioned performing arts scholarship would also be taxable—a result
arguably inconsistent with the music of § 117 even if not necessarily
inconsistent with the lyrics.
In short, it would not be ridiculous for the IRS to announce that in § 117
it discerned a dividing line between revenue and nonrevenue sports
according to which conditional scholarships in revenue sports constitute
payment for services (resulting in taxability of the scholarships) but
identically conditioned scholarships in nonrevenue sports (as well as in the
performing arts) do not constitute payment for services. On the other hand,
the proposed distinction (1) does not exactly jump out from either the statute

179. Of course, there may or may not be positive net revenue from a revenue sport. But the
determination of net revenue is manipulable and debatable. Note, too, that seven-figure coaches’ salaries
play a prominent role in reducing universities’ net revenue from revenue sports and that those salaries
merely shift the benefit of the student-athletes’ efforts from the universities to the coaches.
180. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(d)(2), 53 Fed. Reg. 21,688, 21,688 (June 9, 1998); see also Treas.
Reg. § 1.117-4(c).
181. Of course, in the case of women’s sports, one of the benefits may be allowing a university to
have a revenue-producing football team without violating Title IX or 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2018).
182. See, for example, the scholarship rules of the Manhattan School of Music. Financial Aid FAQs,
MANHATTAN SCH. MUSIC , www.msmnyc.edu/admissions/scholarships-financial-aid/financial-aidfaqs/#MSM%20Scholarships (last visited Aug. 12, 2019) (select “What do I need to do to renew my
MSM Scholarship each year?” link under “MSM Scholarships”). Among other requirements for renewing
a scholarship for the next academic year, a recipient must “[u]phold an exemplary performance and
participation in all performances, ensembles, and classes.” Id. In addition, “[i]f a Professional Studies or
Doctor of Musical Arts student receives a scholarship, they [sic] may be required to participate in large
ensemble performance cycles as assigned by the Office of Performance Operations.” Id.
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or the regulations, (2) creates line-drawing problems concerning what counts
as a revenue sport,183 and (3) would exempt scholarships received by mostly
white student-athletes in nonrevenue sports while taxing scholarships
received by mostly black student-athletes in the two revenue sports.184 Given
the problems with drawing the distinction, it seems the better part of valor
for the IRS not to distinguish between revenue and nonrevenue sports—
keeping in mind that the proposed approach would permit tax-free athletic
scholarships in all sports as long as the scholarships cannot be canceled in
the current academic year for nonparticipation.
So much for our analysis of the tax consequences of athletic
scholarships, assuming no fundamental change in the nature of the
relationship between scholarship athletes and their universities. A different,
more speculative, question has also generated commentary in the past few
years: whether universities could reclassify their scholarship athletes as
employees and yet continue to provide the bulk of the athletes’ compensation
as various types of tax-free fringe benefits.185 We do not find the question
particularly pressing because our crystal ball tells us that universities are not
going to reclassify scholarship athletes as employees any time soon.
Nevertheless, there is one issue in this area worthy of a brief detour.
Section 117(d) provides that gross income shall not include any
qualified tuition reduction (“QTR”) and defines a QTR as “any reduction in
tuition provided to an employee of [a college or university] . . . for the
education (below the graduate level) at such organization . . . of . . . such
employee . . . .” 186 Would full-tuition scholarships for student-employeeathletes qualify for exclusion under § 117(d)? The statute includes a
nondiscrimination rule with respect to the provision of QTRs,187 which at
first glance suggests that tuition reductions available only to employeeathletes might not qualify for the exclusion. However, the rule only prohibits
discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees (“HCEs”), and the
definition of an HCE provides that an employee’s total compensation must

183. If the distinction is stated as being between football and men’s basketball on the one hand, and
everything else on the other, then University of Connecticut women’s basketball is a nonrevenue sport,
and the most poorly-attended and least-often-televised men’s basketball team in Division I is a revenue
sport.
184. For detailed demographics of participants (with or without athletic scholarships) in the various
NCAA sports, see Student-Athlete Data, NCAA, http://web1.ncaa.org/rgdSearch/exec/saSearch (last
visited Aug. 12, 2019).
185. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 167, at 1161–67; Morehouse, supra note 163, at 1434−36.
186. I.R.C. § 117(d)(1)−(2) (2018).
187. Id. § 117(d)(3).
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exceed $125,000 for the employee to be considered an HCE.188 We expect
that all student-employee-athletes would be compensated well below that
threshold, even at the most generous and most expensive universities.
But there is a second hurdle less easily overcome. According to the
regulations, a QTR is fully excludable from gross income only if the
university also pays the employee taxable compensation equal to or greater
than the rate of compensation ordinarily paid for similar services performed
by an individual who is not the recipient of a QTR; if there is no other taxable
compensation or if the other taxable compensation is less than the fair market
value of the services, then the tuition reduction is partly or fully taxable (in
other words, taxable up to the point that the other taxable compensation plus
the taxable portion of the tuition reduction equals the fair market value of the
services).189
It would be a nightmare to determine the fair market value of a studentemployee-athlete’s services; values could vary greatly across sports and
across individuals within sports. Suppose, though, that the IRS announced—
perhaps with an eye toward compensation levels in minor league baseball,
the National Basketball Association’s G-League, and the Canadian Football
League, among other places—that universities could use $35,000 as the fair
market value of the services of all of its athletes, no questions asked. Suppose
also that each athlete received other taxable compensation (cash, in-kind
room and board) totaling $20,000. Finally, consider two full-tuition
scholarships: one of $15,000 (covering in-state tuition at a public university)
and the other of $45,000 (covering tuition at a private university or out-ofstate tuition at a public university). On these assumed facts, the in-state
public university tuition is fully taxable because the sum of other taxable
compensation ($20,000) and the scholarship ($15,000) does not exceed the
fair market value of the athlete’s services ($35,000). The same amount
($15,000) of the $45,000 scholarship is taxable (in order to bring the taxable
compensation up to the fair market value of the services), but the other
$30,000 qualifies for the § 117(d) exclusion.
The bottom line is that in the unlikely event that universities reclassify

188. Id. § 414(q); I.R.S. Notice 2018-83, 2018-47 I.R.B. 774 (providing an inflation adjustment for
§ 414(q)).
189. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-2(a)(1) (2019) (as amended in 1964). This regulation predates the 1984
and 1986 revisions of § 117 and, thus, does not directly address § 117(d). Post-1986 proposed regulations
(which, for some reason, have never been finalized) reflect the current statute and more explicitly call for
the approach described in the text. Income Taxes; Exclusion from Gross Income of Qualified
Scholarships, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,688, 21,692–93 (proposed June 9, 1988) (to be codified at Treas. Reg.
§ 1.117(6)(d)).
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their scholarship athletes as employees § 117(d) should be reasonably
effective in sheltering out-of-state and private university tuition scholarships
from tax but much less effective in sheltering in-state public university
tuition scholarships. Another possibility is that universities (with or without
the blessing of the IRS) might value the labor of their athletes in the
suggested neighborhood of $35,000 in sports with significant markets for the
services of professional athletes but value the services of athletes in other
sports (for example, fencing, wrestling, and gymnastics) at zero or close to
zero. This would have the interesting—and probably objectionable—effect
of making tuition reductions largely taxable for athletes in those sports with
professional (nonacademic) markets and entirely tax-free for athletes in
sports without such markets.
III. THE 80 PERCENT SOLUTION
Among the provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 was one
that repealed § 170(l), which had been a part of the Internal Revenue Code
since 1988. This provision allowed a deduction of 80 percent of the amount
of donations to universities in which the donation was conditioned on the
grant of rights to purchase tickets to university athletic events. In light of the
repeal, this provision may seem now to be a dead letter. However, the history
of this issue—which is characterized by considerable back-and-forth
movements—coupled with Congress’s demonstrated proclivity for favoring
college sports suggests that this is an area that warrants continued vigilance.
Under the rules of the erstwhile § 170(l), donors to college and
university athletics programs were allowed to deduct 80 percent of the
amount contributed even if the donor “receive[d] (directly or indirectly) as a
result of paying such amount the right to purchase tickets for seating at an
athletic event . . . .”190 This rather strange rule represented the culmination
of an entertaining but ultimately dispiriting dispute between athletics
boosters and the IRS that began in 1984 with the publication of Revenue
Ruling 84-132.191 That ruling examined a hypothetical situation in which a
donor received for a contribution of $300 per year—a comically small
amount by today’s standards—the right to purchase a season football ticket
in a “preferred” location between the two forty yard lines. 192 The ruling also
hypothesized that there was a waiting list of potential donors who sought this
privilege. 193 Under the circumstances, the IRS rather easily concluded that
190.
191.
192.
193.

I.R.C. § 170(l)(2)(B).
Rev. Rul. 84-132, 1984-2 C.B. 55.
Id.
Id.
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the ticket-access privilege had “significant value” and that the donor could,
therefore, deduct no part of the payment unless he could show that his
donation exceeded the value of the ticket-access privilege. 194 (Implicitly this
would be exceedingly unlikely in a situation in which would-be donors were
on a waiting list to be allowed the privilege.)
This was nothing more than a straightforward application of the wellestablished doctrine of disallowance of “gifts” that involved quid pro quo
values returned to the donor as part of the exchange. This principle was most
authoritatively established by the Supreme Court in Hernandez v.
Commissioner,195 a case decided a few years after the ruling itself. Although
the IRS has decided, for reasons never fully disclosed, not to enforce
Hernandez as to the actual facts that gave rise to it,196 there can be little doubt
that the quid pro quo doctrine was and is good law. Although it was decided
after the IRS had issued its ruling on athletic ticket privileges, the IRS had
had some previous success in establishing this doctrine. In American Bar
Endowment v. United States, the government argued that amounts paid to the
Endowment as premiums for life insurance policies were in no part
deductible despite the fact that the policies were priced at a level that allowed
the Endowment, a charitable entity, to make a profit on the sales. 197 The
premiums were, nevertheless, at amounts not exceeding the cost of similar
insurance available to the policyholders through commercial insurance
companies, so no deduction was allowed. Although the final result in this
case was not determined until the Supreme Court decided it in 1986, the IRS
had won the first round with the Claims Court decision that was announced
on January 31, 1984; the IRS issued its ruling later that year.198
The theory behind the ban on deductions of quid pro quo transactions

194. Id.
195. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 689–91 (1989).
196. The case involved payments for “auditing sessions” provided by the Church of Scientology.
Id. at 683–86. The IRS announced its intention to allow deductions for such contributions in Revenue
Ruling 93-73, 1993-2 C.B. 75, notwithstanding its successful outcome denying such deductions in
Hernandez.
197. Am. Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 404, 405 (1984), rev’d, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
198. This case has a complicated procedural history, which can be briefly summarized as follows:
both the Endowment and individual policyholders were parties to a consolidated case involving the IRS
claims that the Endowment enjoyed UBI from the sale of the insurance and that the policyholders were
entitled to no deductions for any part of their premiums. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 107–09. The
Endowment prevailed at the Claims Court level, while the taxpayer-policyholders did not. Id. The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the result as to the Endowment but reversed as to the taxpayerpolicyholders. Id. However, this result was not announced until after the IRS had issued Revenue Ruling
84-132. Ultimately the Supreme Court decided this case for the government on all points: the premiums
were UBI to the Endowment and were not deductible by the taxpayer-policyholders. Id. at 112–19.
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is eminently reasonable: the charitable donation deduction is meant to reflect
true donations not exchanges of more or less equal value. If the latter were
deductible, why would deductions not be allowed for the payment of hospital
bills by patients or the payment of tuition by students? The IRS has gotten
this right, and so has the Supreme Court, generally by wide margins. 199
Despite the soundness of its position, the IRS responded to the firestorm
of criticism of Revenue Ruling 84-132 by suspending it later in the same
year.200 Its announcement offered no new opinion on the merits but simply
indicated that the IRS would hold hearings on the question before finally
deciding its position. A bit over a year later, the IRS, to its credit, stuck by
its guns and ruled again that contributions conditioned on the grant of seat
privileges were not deductible. 201
Several bills were introduced in Congress later in 1986 to reverse this
result, and a provision to that effect was included in the House bill that
became the Tax Reform Act of 1986.202 However, the provision was dropped
in conference, and the IRS position survived for a time. 203 It survived, that
is, as to all colleges and universities except the University of Texas and
Louisiana State University, which benefited from a special “rifle shot”
provision that had been slipped in through the back door of the legislative
process by Senator Russell Long of Louisiana and Representative J.J. Pickle
of Texas.204
But in the next major tax act, the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988 205 (which really was a major act despite its diffident title),
Congress overruled the IRS, adding § 170(l) to the Code. 206 Pointedly
199. The single dissent in American Bar Endowment was by Justice Stevens and related to the UBIT
issue rather than to the quid pro quo gift issue. Id. at 119–21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Hernandez was
more complicated with Justices O’Connor and Scalia dissenting on the only issue in that case, the
charitable deduction. The dissenting opinion by Justice O’Connor emphasized the inconsistent treatment
by the IRS of payments for religious benefits. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 713 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
200. I.R.S. Announcement 84-101, 1984-45 I.R.B. 21.
201. Rev. Rul. 86-63, 1986-1 C.B. 88.
202. See Conrad Teitell, A Look at the Provisions in the Technical Corrections and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988 That Will Affect charities and Their Donors, 128 TR. & EST. 58, 61 (1989) for a
description of the legislative response to Revenue Ruling 86-63.
203. Id.
204. This was a rifle shot of the classic form: the favored institutions were described in terms of
such things as the date of their founding or the date of their most recent stadium renovations rather than
by name. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 1608, 100 Stat. 2085, 2771. For a fuller
explanation of the “rifle shot” approach, see generally Lawrence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules
and Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation Constitutional?, 44 TAX L. REV. 563 (1969).
205. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L 100-647, sec. 6001, § 170(m) 102
Stat. 3342, 3683–84 (1988) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(l) (2018)).
206. This provision was added as § 170(m) but renumbered later as subsection (l).
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flexing its muscles, Congress even added a rather unusual provision allowing
refund claims by anyone who lost his or her deduction due to this frolic of
the IRS during the previous four years, even as to tax years for which the
statute of limitations on adjustments would otherwise have expired. 207
Congress meant not merely to overrule the IRS but to obliterate any trace
effects of the IRS’s attempt to rein in this abusive practice.
There is very little explanation of what Congress was thinking. Because
it was added as an amendment, no reason for change appeared in any
committee report. However, a Joint Committee explanation did the best it
could: “The proposal would eliminate otherwise unavoidable valuation
controversies between the IRS and many individual taxpayers as to the
proper treatment of payments to college athletic scholarship programs.”208
Indeed, valuation controversies are not unimaginable under some
circumstances. If a college sports program announced to its boosters that
very generous donors would be rewarded with the opportunity to acquire
good seats to football or basketball games, or both, some donors might give
large gifts and then argue that they did so because of their large hearts and
that they could have given less and gotten similar favors. They might point
to other donors who got good seats for smaller contributions arguing that
anything over the smallest donation that yielded good-seat privileges was
deductible. The IRS might then need to evaluate the precise quality of the
seats of the two donors to assure that they were in fact comparable—that, for
example, end-zone seats were not being compared to sideline seats. These
questions can be difficult as the controversies over valuation of “skybox”
seats for purposes of § 274 of the Code have shown.209
But it would not seem generally to be in the interest of universities to
structure their seat privilege policies this way. Seekers of seats, or better
seats, want to know what it takes to get them. Vagueness on this question
would be annoying, and no university wants to annoy alumni and friends
who are trying to give it money. It is possible that some booster organizations
might attempt some subterfuge, in which the precise dollar amounts are not
published, but could be whispered by the managers of the organizations210

207.
208.

This provision was added by the Senate and adopted by the Conference.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-15-88, DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 433 AS AMENDED 15 (1988).
209. See Richard Schmalbeck & Jay A. Soled, The Cultural Symbolism of the Deductible Skybox,
126 TAX NOTES 1524, 1524 (2010).
210. At Duke we call this organization the Iron Dukes. It is a subdivision of our athletics department,
staffed by university employees. Most colleges that participate in big-time sports have a counterpart
organization.
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to alumni and friends who call seeking this information. However, the IRS
should be able to penetrate such a ruse fairly easily. It would observe that
many contributions were of exactly the same amount, the presumptive
minimum; it could also simply ask the university to tell it what that number
is or to state officially that no such number existed—a statement which
would, if false, be a felony.
At Duke, there is no ambiguity. Football tickets have in recent years
been available without any special contribution because Duke’s football
team has a long history of mediocrity, or worse.211 Basketball tickets, on the
other hand, are a scarce and valuable resource. There are some breaks for
students, faculty, and other insiders, but a fan—even an alumnus—with no
current connection to the university must make an annual contribution of
$8,000 to be entitled to buy two season basketball tickets, the purchase of
which will incur an additional charge of $2,000 or more depending on the
location of the tickets.212 Valuation of the seat privileges would not seem to
be difficult under these circumstances, which are common among big-time
sports.
The earliest version of this Article was presented by Professor
Schmalbeck at a conference in 2014. 213 At that time, he suggested that the
prospects for achieving this reform were poor but that it was barely possible
that Congress could be persuaded to adopt a rule that was very clearly a
positive tax reform and would raise a modest amount of revenue. And, in
fact, Treasury officials were in the audience at that conference, and they
suggested that the Treasury Office of Tax Policy include repeal of § 170(l)
in President Obama’s budget message to Congress the following year. This
was in fact done in both 2015 and 2016.
Later when the House Ways and Means Committee was seeking
revenue-increasing reform measures to add to what became the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017, it included a provision repealing the 80 percent rule.
Somewhat surprisingly, it survived the legislative process, despite the
absence of a counterpart provision in the Senate version of the bill, and
211. This has changed with the Duke football team qualifying for a postseason bowl game in six of
the last seven seasons. Despite the recent success, football at Duke has still not found its audience, and to
date football tickets are still available at list price (or sometimes less) as the university struggles to fill
even its modestly-sized stadium. But if success continues, one can expect sometime soon that the buying
of seat licenses to football games will become the norm for football as well as basketball.
212. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 22, at 99–100.
213. The conference was sponsored by the National Center for Philanthropy and Law at the New
York University Law School. The Article discussed only Parts I and III contained in the current version
of which Professor Schmalbeck was the initial author. Professor Zelenak was the initial author of Parts II
and IV discussed herein.
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became law, effective for 2018 and subsequent years. And while this reform
obviously required the support of several people with actual power (that is,
people other than academics), it seems fair to note that this issue had not
been on the radar of tax reformers and might have gone unnoticed but for the
earlier draft of this article.
Will this reform endure? One hopes that it will. The 80 percent
deduction was a terrible rule that should never have been added to the
Internal Revenue Code in the first place. But the vehemence with which
Congress spoke to this question in 1988 (remember that it felt so strongly
that it even added a provision effectively waiving the statute of limitations
to impose the 80 percent rule retroactively) suggests that this issue may not
yet be sincerely dead.
IV. THE NEW EXCISE TAX ON EXCESSIVE COMPENSATION
Everybody complains about the multimillion dollar salaries of college
football and basketball coaches, but nobody does anything about them. Well,
not anymore. In 2017, Congress added § 4960 to the Internal Revenue Code,
imposing a 21 percent excise tax on the compensation of an employee of a
tax-exempt organization to the extent the employee’s compensation exceeds
$1 million if the employee is among the organization’s five most highlycompensated employees. 214 In addition to organizations exempt from
income taxation under § 501(a), the new excise tax applies to organizations
with income excluded from taxation under § 115(1). 215 Section 115(1)
provides that “gross income does not include . . . income derived
from . . . the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to
a State or any political subdivision thereof.” 216 It is the only income tax
provision of the Internal Revenue Code expressly exempting income of state
or local governments.
As the bill containing proposed § 4960 worked its way through
Congress and to the President’s desk in late 2017, news reports on the
provision stated that as drafted it would apply to both private universities (as
organizations exempt from tax under § 501(a)) and public universities (as
organizations with income excludable under § 115(1)), and that the major
impact of the tax would be on universities paying seven or even eight-figure
salaries to their football and men’s basketball coaches. 217 The authors of one
214. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 13602(a), § 4960, 131 Stat. 2054,
2157–59 (codified at I.R.C. § 4960 (2018)).
215. I.R.C. § 4960(c)(1) (2018).
216. Id. § 115(1).
217. See, e.g., Steve Berkowitz, New Tax Bill Will Impact the Sports World Starting with Millions
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article reported that, based on their analysis (done in partnership with USA
Today), there are at least 240 coaches and athletic directors across the FBS
(including both public and private universities) receiving compensation in
excess of $1 million. 218
A. DOES THE NEW EXCISE TAX APPLY TO PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES?
However, less than a week after President Trump signed the 2017 tax
bill into law, tax law professor Ellen Aprill explained in a lengthy blog post
that “[w]hile the drafters evidently intended to impose a 21% excise tax on
both public and tax-exempt private institutions . . . , they appear to have
inadvertently left public universities off the hook.” 219 The problem,
according to Professor Aprill, was that—contrary to what one might
conclude from simply reading the Internal Revenue Code—public
universities generally owed their tax-exempt status not to § 115(1) but to the
until-then obscure doctrine of implied statutory immunity, according to
which (as she explained) “[u]nless otherwise specified in the Internal
Revenue Code, states and their political subdivisions are not taxpayers under
the Code, and their income is not gross income within the meaning of section
61.” 220 Because nothing in § 4960 stated that the new tax applied to an
organization exempt from tax by reason of implied statutory immunity,
Professor Aprill concluded that the tax did not apply to public universities.

in Costs for Colleges, USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:04 PM), https://redef.com/item/5a3ab4dad
7bd411112e4d6ea?curator=SportsREDEF; Robert Lattinville & Roger Denny, How the New Excise Tax
Impacts Coach Compensation, ATHLETIC D IRECTOR U.COM , https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/howthe-new-excise-tax-impacts-coach-compensation (last visited Aug. 12, 2019) (written by two lawyers
specializing in issues relating to compensation of college coaches); Gabrielle McMillen, That New Tax
Bill? It’s Going to Hit College Athletics—Hard, SPORTING NEWS (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.
sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-football/news/tax-bill-congress-excise-tax-college-football-basketball-trump
/1xib0mbmqidzx19sl9zqk2g3yx; Ralph D. Russo, College Coaches’ Salaries Increase Despite Threat of
New Tax, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2017/12/13/college-coachessalaries-increase-despite-threat-of-new-tax/108562894 (last updated Dec. 13, 2017, 2:48 AM). Sevenfigure salaries of university presidents and other executives of nonprofit organizations are also subject to
the new tax, but a special rule exempts amounts paid to a licensed medical professional (including a
veterinarian) for the performance of medical or veterinary services by such a professional. I.R.C.
§ 4960(c)(3)(B).
218. Lattinville & Denny, supra note 217. According to USA Today, in 2018 twenty-one assistant
college football coaches were paid more than $1 million. NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY, https://sports.
usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/football/assistant (last visited Aug, 12, 2019).
219. Ellen Aprill, Congress Fumbles the Ball on Section 4960, MEDIUM (Dec. 26, 2017),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/congress-fumbles-the-ball-on-section-4960-guest-postby-ellen-aprill-18a2dbf98c5f.
220. Id. Professor Aprill cited I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 7904006 (Jan. 22, 1978) as an example of
the IRS determining that a public university was tax-exempt by reason of implied statutory immunity
rather than by reason of § 115(1).
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But this was only the beginning. Another tax professor, Douglas Kahn,
argued in Tax Notes that the tax did apply to public universities, even if
Professor Aprill was right about § 115(1) and the immunity doctrine,
because the tax expressly applied to organizations exempt under § 501(a)
and § 501(c)(3) and “all or almost all state universities are incorporated, and
so section 501(c)(3) applies to them.”221 Professor Aprill in turn replied that
Professor Kahn might be right with respect to any public university that had
applied for and received from the IRS a letter confirming its tax-exempt
status under §501(c)(3)—which some public universities have done,
primarily to reassure donors of the deductibility of their contributions—but
not with respect to the many public universities that had not done so.222 On
the other hand, the rule that an organization must apply to the IRS for
recognition of tax-exempt status as a condition of exemption applies only to
organizations organized after October 9, 1969.223 Certainly the vast majority
of public universities paying seven-figure coaches’ salaries are older than
that, and thus would be exempt under § 501(c)(3) as long as they satisfied
the substantive requirements for exemption. In any event, as Professor Aprill
pointed out, even under Professor Kahn’s analysis, a public university could
avoid the new excise tax simply by voluntarily renouncing its § 501(c)(3)
status and relying instead solely on implied statutory immunity for its
income-tax exemption.224
Prominent exempt-organizations tax lawyer Marcus Owens also took
issue with the analysis in Professor Aprill’s original blog post, for a reason
distinct from Professor Kahn’s. Owens noted that, in a 1978 General Counsel
Memorandum, the IRS had “suggest[ed] the possibility that the “related”
income streams of all states colleges and universities escape taxation by
virtue of section 115(1), rather than by notions of intergovernmental
immunity.”225 If that suggestion was correct, Owens explained, the reference
in § 4960 to § 115(1) would suffice to make public universities subject to the
new tax.
In postenactment, informal, public comments on § 4960, government
officials expressed a range of views concerning whether the new tax applies
to public universities. Elinor Ramey, an attorney-adviser in Treasury’s
221. Douglas A. Kahn, Does Excise Tax on Excessive Comp Apply to State Universities?, 158 TAX
NOTES 397, 398 (2018).
222. Ellen P. Aprill, Response to Professor Kahn: Tax Status of Public Universities, 158 TAX
NOTES 539, 539−40 (2018).
223. I.R.C. § 508(a) (2018).
224. Aprill, supra note 222, at 542.
225. Letter from Marc Owens, Loeb & Loeb LLP, to Paul Streckfus (Dec. 28, 2017) (on file with
authors).
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Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, opined that the provision as enacted does
not necessarily apply to all public universities and that technical correction
legislation may be needed to effectuate the congressional intent to apply the
tax to all universities.226 Veena K. Murthy, legislation counsel at the Joint
Committee on Taxation, also stated that § 4960 “requires a statutory
technical correction” to make it applicable to public universities. 227 On the
other hand, an unnamed Senate Finance Committee staffer told Tax Notes
that § 4960, as enacted, covers public universities and that there is no need
for a technical correction. 228 Another possibility—halfway between the
positions that no fix is needed and that only Congress can make the fix—is
that the Treasury could issue a valid regulation declaring that public
universities are tax-exempt by reason of § 115(1) and thus subject to the new
tax. 229 Although such a regulation would be contrary to numerous IRS
pronouncements issued over many decades, it might, nevertheless, be valid
given that (1) it would be entitled to Chevron deference; 230 (2) past IRS
pronouncements are not entirely consistent in this area (as demonstrated by
the conflict between the pronouncements cited by Professor Aprill and by
Owens231); and (3) the past IRS pronouncements, although numerous, have
been exclusively in the form of lower-level written determinations, which by
statute may not be used or cited as precedent. 232
Things were generally quiet on the § 4960 front for most of 2018, but
there was a flurry of activity in December 2018 and January 2019. In midDecember the Joint Committee on Taxation released its General Explanation
of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act stating that covered organizations “are intended
to include state colleges and universities” but also stating in a noncommittal
footnote that “[a] technical correction may be necessary to reflect this

226. Fred Stokeld, Ideas for Guidance on New Tax Law Welcomed, 158 TAX N OTES 1138, 1138
(2018).
227. Allyson Versprille, Nonprofit Executive Pay Glitch Needs Fix: Joint Tax Counsel,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 25, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employee-benefits/nonprofit
-executive-pay-glitch-needs-fix-joint-tax-counsel.
228. Stephanie Cumings, Will the Nick Saban Tax Apply to Nick Saban?, 158 TAX NOTES 1569,
1570 (2018).
229. Professor Aprill mentions (but does not endorse) this possibility in her reply to Professor Kahn.
Aprill, supra note 222, at 543 & n.26.
230. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984) (holding that
an agency may choose, by regulation, among reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous statute); see
also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53–58 (2011) (holding
Chevron applies to tax regulations).
231. Compare I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 7904006 (Jan. 22, 1978) (holding a public university taxexempt by reason of implied statutory immunity), with I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,657 (Aug. 31, 1978)
(discussing public university tax exemption on its related income by reason of § 115(1)).
232. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2018).
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intent.”233 In early January 2019, the IRS weighed in with a notice providing
“Interim Guidance Under Section 4960.” 234 According to the notice, a
governmental entity is subject to § 4960 (by reason of being an applicable
tax-exempt organization (“ATEO”)) in only two situations: (1) the entity is
exempt from tax under § 501(a) or (2) the entity has income excluded under
§ 115(1).235 Although the notice states that a public university with an IRS
determination letter recognizing it as a § 501(c)(3) organization is subject to
the new excise tax, the notice goes on to explain that such a university can
relinquish its determination letter and thereby avoid being subject to the
excise tax by reason of the letter. 236 The notice’s discussion of § 115(1) is
less straightforward: “[A] state, political subdivision of a state, or integral
part of a state or political subdivision, often referred to as a ‘governmental
unit,’ does not meet the requirements to exclude income from gross income
under section 115(1) because section 115(1) does not apply to income from
an activity that the state conducts directly, rather than through a separate
entity.”237 So, according to the notice, as long as a public university does not
currently possess an IRS determination letter and is not a separate entity,
§ 4960 does not apply. Obviously this puts tremendous pressure on the
otherwise rather esoteric question of whether a particular public university
is or is not a separate entity. In this regard, bear in mind Professor Kahn’s
observation that “all or almost all state universities are incorporated,” 238
which one might suppose would make them separate entities and so subject
to § 4960.
The other development in early January was the release, by outgoing
Ways and Means Chair Kevin Brady, of a discussion draft of a bill containing
numerous technical corrections relating to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017.239 (Prospects for enactment of the bill in the near term are slim indeed.)
The bill would add “is described in section 511(a)(2)(B)” to the list of types
of entities subject to the new excise tax. 240 As explained below, 241 this
addition would unmistakably situate public universities within the scope of
233. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC
LAW 115-97, at 264 & n.1251 (Comm. Print 2018).
234. I.R.S. Notice 2019-09, 2019-04 I.R.B. 403.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Kahn, supra note 221, at 398.
239. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL CORRECTIONS ACT
DISCUSSION DRAFT (2019), https://republicans-waysandmeansforms.house.gov/uploadedfiles/tax_tech
nical_and_clerical_corrections_act_discussion_draft.pdf.
240. Id. at 38.
241. See infra text accompanying note 246.
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the tax. Interestingly, the Joint Committee’s explanation of the bill states that
“[t]he provision clarifies that all State colleges and universities described in
section 511(a)(2)(B) are applicable tax-exempt organizations for purposes of
the new excise tax” thus suggesting (contrary to the position taken by the
IRS in its notice) that all public universities are already ATEOs, even
without the enactment of the technical correction. 242
Before moving on to the broader question of whether a version of
§ 4960 applicable to all universities would constitute good tax policy, we
close the discussion of the public university question with two observations.
First, in light of the facts (1) that Professor Aprill’s postenactment blog
commentary seemed to have taken everyone by surprise and (2) that in the
postenactment discussions everyone (including Professor Aprill) seemed to
agree that Congress intended the new tax to apply to public universities as
well as to private ones, it is strange that there were, in fact, pre-enactment
rumblings that the provision as drafted might not apply to publics. A story in
Inside Higher Ed from November 2017 described proposed § 4960 as an
excise tax on high earners at private tax-exempt organizations, without any
suggestion that Congress wanted to reach publics as well as privates. 243
Similarly, a mid-December story in the Chronicle of Higher Education on
the proposed tax identified 158 employees of private nonprofit universities,
each of whom was paid at least $1 million (excluding medical staff
members), apparently on the assumption that only those institutions would
be subject to the tax.244 And, almost two months before Professor Aprill’s
blog post, the Washington Examiner reported that Professor Elaine Wilson
found the bill “ambiguous” with respect to whether it covered both public
and private universities.245
Second, the ambiguity in the scope of § 4960 is the result of a decidedly
unforced drafting error, given the readily available example of
§ 511(a)(2)(B) of the Code. Section 511(a)(2)(B), helpfully headed “State
Colleges and Universities,” states that the tax on UBI of otherwise tax-

242. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-1-19, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE CHARIMAN’S D ISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE “TAX TECHNICAL AND
CLERICAL CORRECTIONS ACT” 11 (Comm. Print 2019) (emphasis added).
243. Rick Seltzer, Off the Pedestal, I NSIDE H IGHER ED (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.insidehigh
ered.com/news/2017/11/06/excise-taxes-colleges-spark-criticism-may-signal-tough-future-higher-ed.
244. Adam Harris & Dan Bauman, New Tax Law Takes Aim at Higher Education’s Millionaire
Club, CHRON. H IGHER EDUC. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/New-Tax-Law-Takes
-Aim-at/242095.
245. David M. Drucker & Joseph Lawler, GOP Tax Plan Could Crimp Million-Dollar College
Coaches, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 3, 2017, 4:51 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/gop-taxplan-could-crimp-million-dollar-college-coaches.
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exempt organizations “shall apply in the case of any college or university
which is an agency or instrumentality of any government or political
subdivision thereof, or which is owned or operated by a government or any
political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of one or
more governments or political subdivisions.”246 As one would expect from
that language, it is settled law that the tax on UBI applies to public
universities in the same way it applies to privates. If the drafters of § 4960
had simply borrowed the language of § 511, they could have spared everyone
all the confusion—still far from resolved—recounted above. The story is an
object lesson—one of many provided by the 2017 tax legislation—in the
perils of hasty enactment of complicated tax laws.
B. BUT WHAT ABOUT THE POLICY?
As difficult as it is to avert one’s gaze from the train wreck that was the
drafting of § 4960, in the end, the more important question is whether the
provision constitutes good policy. Let us assume that Congress intended the
provision to apply to both public and private universities and that one way
or another—by technical correction, by treasury regulation, or simply by an
interpretation by the IRS upheld by the courts—it is eventually settled that
the provision does so apply. Although the new tax does not expressly target
big-time college sports and although it will certainly have some impact
outside of university athletic programs, it is obvious that § 4960 is, in both
purpose and effect, largely a tax on universities paying seven- and eightfigure salaries to their football and men’s basketball coaches. What, if
anything, justifies the tax?
The tax is clearly related to Congress’s 2017 decision to get serious
about § 162(m) of the Code. A bit of background is in order here. In 1993
Congress enacted § 162(m), supposedly denying publicly held corporations
business expense deductions for compensation paid to their top executives
of more than $1 million per person (an amount that has never been adjusted
for inflation). 247 We say “supposedly” because a broad exception for
performance-based compensation made it child’s play for corporations to
avoid the provision. 248 In the 2017 legislation, Congress removed the
exception for performance-based compensation, thus, giving the deduction
disallowance real force for the first time in its existence. 249 The newly246. I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(B) (2018).
247. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 13211(a), § 162(m) 107
Stat. 312, 469–71 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m) (2018)).
248. Id.
249. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 13601(a)(1), § 162(m), 131 Stat.
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invigorated § 162(m) makes no particular policy sense; for top executives of
publicly held corporations, compensation in excess (in fact, well in excess)
of $1 million would easily qualify as ordinary and necessary under the
general business expense deduction rule of § 162(a), thus making such
compensation properly deductible if the goal is accurate measurement of a
corporation’s net income. 250 It may seem strange, then, that affected
corporations did not raise an outcry over the 2017 strengthening of § 162(m).
The apparent explanation for the corporations that did not bark is that they
understood the strengthening of § 162(m) as part of a package deal that also
reduced the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent. 251 Realizing
that the rate reduction was much more beneficial than the deduction denial
was harmful and that it would be churlish—or worse, self-defeating—to
complain about the negative aspect of a very positive package deal,
corporations did not complain.
As Congress was imposing a sort of tax penalty on executive
compensation paid by for-profit corporations, it apparently occurred to
Congress that some tax-exempt organizations also paid salaries of more than
$1 million, and that if there was going to be (for the first time) a meaningful
penalty tax in the one case, there should also be a penalty tax in the other.
The problem, of course, was that the tax penalty could not take the form of
a deduction-denial provision if the organization paying the seven- or eightfigure salary was exempt from tax. The solution, as obvious as the problem,
was to impose the penalty by way of an excise tax on salaries over $1 million
rather than by way of disallowing deductions. Section 4960 was the result.
But while for-profit corporations had been mollified by another, highly
favorable, aspect of the 2017 legislation, for universities the introduction of
§ 4960 was one more punitive feature of legislation they viewed as a very
bad package deal—most notably for the new excise tax on investment
income from large endowments and for the disallowance of charitable
deductions for contributions giving donors the right to purchase tickets to
football or basketball games.252
If we consider § 162(m) and § 4960 apart from their very different
2054, 2155 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m) (2018)).
250. In its tax expenditure estimates, the Joint Committee on Taxation has long treated § 162(m) as
a negative (or reverse) tax expenditure, resulting in taxing affected corporations on more than their true
net income. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM . ON TAXATION, JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016−2020, at 37 (Comm. Print 2017).
251. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 13001(a), § 11(b), 131 Stat. 2054,
2096 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 11(b) (2018)).
252. Id. sec. 13701(a), § 4968 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4968 (2018)) (enacting the § 4968
tax on investment income); id. sec. 13704(a), § 170(l) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(l) (2018)).
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package-deal contexts, it is actually quite a bit easier to make a case for the
excise tax than it is to make a case for the deduction denial. If one accepts
(as our current Congress surely does) the basic tenets of twenty-first-century
American capitalism, then there is nothing inherently objectionable about
seven- or eight-figure compensation packages for top corporate executives.
By contrast, one might well conclude that there is something deeply
troubling about tax-exempt institutions of higher education providing
multimillion-dollar compensation packages to their football and basketball
coaches—and that the mere fact that the salaries are the result of market
forces may not be justification enough. For someone thinking along those
lines, § 4960 might seem an appropriate legislative response—expressing
disapproval (and raising some tax revenue in the bargain) while avoiding the
much more draconian approach of a hard ceiling on the amount of
compensation consistent with a payor’s tax-exempt status. The provision can
be understood as targeting excessive coaches’ salaries—not excessive in the
sense of being more than the market value of coaches’ services, but excessive
based on widely-shared (albeit undeniably subjective) value judgments
about what salary levels are contextually appropriate, the market be
damned. 253 Interestingly, although § 4960 reflects a market-be-damned
attitude toward salaries of coaches (and university presidents), the statutory
exemption for seven-figure salaries paid to medical professionals indicates
congressional acceptance of market-driven salaries for physicians. 254
Understanding § 4960 as reflecting a market-be-damned disapproval of
seven-figure coaches’ salaries (and assuming it applies to public universities
as well as to private ones), we think the provision is quite defensible on
policy grounds.
A different policy defense—which we note here without endorsing it—
might view the provision as an alternative to taxing the net income produced
by big-time college sports as UBI. From an expressive standpoint, it is
arguably less radical—and so more acceptable—for the federal tax system
to take a stand against seven-figure coaches’ salaries than to take the position
that big-time college sports have nothing to do with education.

253. Section 4958 of the Code imposes an excise tax on excess benefit transactions between a taxexempt organization and a disqualified person (defined by § 4958(f)(1)(A) to include “any person . . . in
a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization”). Although some football
and basketball coaches would arguably fit the definition of disqualified persons, an arm’s length salary
reflecting the market value of a coach’s services would not fit the § 4958(c)(1) definition of a taxable
excess benefit transaction no matter how high the salary. Thus, if Congress wanted to penalize (and to
express disapproval of) the salary levels of coaches in big-time college sports, it would need a new
provision; § 4958 would not have done the job.
254. I.R.C. § 4960(c)(3)(B).
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We would resist this trade-off, however, largely on revenue grounds. If
the UBIT were applied to the multibillion dollar advertising and cable
television revenues generated by big-time college sports, with appropriate
guidance disallowing the deduction of expenses related to the “exploited”
exempt activities 255 —namely all the expenses of actually fielding the
teamsthen the revenue potential of applying the UBIT to college sports
would substantially exceed the modest revenue that could be expected from
the excise tax on high salaries.
We close with a comment on the incidence of the § 4960 tax. Of course,
the tax formally falls on the universities, not on the coaches themselves. And
we are confident that in the short run the economic incidence of the tax will
not fall on coaches to any significant extent. A university with a coach under
contract could not reduce its contractual salary obligations on account of the
new tax. Beyond that we are not confident about much of anything in terms
of incidence. Taking a longer-term view, the tax might have some depressing
effect on coaches’ salaries, although we suspect that most of the burden of
the tax will fall elsewhere—on major donors to athletic departments, on the
departments themselves (and within the departments on both revenue and
nonrevenue sports), and on the educational (that is, nonathletic) functions of
the universities. From a policy perspective, § 4960 may ultimately appear
more attractive if the incidence of the tax falls largely on some combination
of coaches, donors, and revenue sports than if it falls largely on nonrevenue
sports and core educational functions.
CONCLUSION
For decades college athletics has enjoyed favorable tax treatment
justified by neither policy considerations nor (for the most part) the terms of
the Internal Revenue Code. Two provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017, the elimination of the charitable donation for ticket purchases and the
excise tax on seven-figure coaches’ salaries, indicate that Congress has had
second thoughts about the sweetheart deal traditionally afforded to college
sports programs by the tax system. Given the attitudinal change on the part
of Congress, now would be an excellent time for the IRS to reconsider those
aspects of the sweetheart deal—relating to the UBIT and to athletic
scholarships—for which the IRS, rather than Congress, has been primarily
responsible.

255.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(d)(1); see also supra text accompanying notes 75−79.

